scholarly journals New attacks on all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1, including the Parallel-DM

1995 ◽  
pp. 410-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars R. Knudsen ◽  
Xuejia Lai
Keyword(s):  
Hash Functions ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Double Block Length ◽  
Hash Rate

Attacks on Fast Double Block Length Hash Functions

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars R. Knudsen ◽  
Xuejia Lai ◽  
Bart Preneel
Keyword(s):  
Hash Functions ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Double Block Length

Security of Cyclic Double Block Length Hash Functions

2009 ◽  
pp. 153-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan Fleischmann ◽  
Michael Gorski ◽  
Stefan Lucks
Keyword(s):  
Hash Functions ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Double Block Length

Analysis of Double Block Length Hash Functions

2003 ◽  
pp. 290-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitsuhiro Hattori ◽  
Shoichi Hirose ◽  
Susumu Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Hash Functions ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Double Block Length

scholarly journals Quantum Free-Start Collision Attacks on Double Block Length Hashing with Round-Reduced AES-256

2021 ◽  
pp. 316-336
Author(s):  
Amit Kumar Chauhan ◽  
Abhishek Kumar ◽  
Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
Keyword(s):  
Time Complexity ◽  
Block Length ◽  
Compression Function ◽  
Collision Attack ◽  
Classical Setting ◽  
Quantum Version ◽  
Collision Attacks ◽  
Double Block Length

Recently, Hosoyamada and Sasaki (EUROCRYPT 2020), and Xiaoyang Dong et al. (ASIACRYPT 2020) proposed quantum collision attacks against AES-like hashing modes AES-MMO and AES-MP. Their collision attacks are based on the quantum version of the rebound attack technique exploiting the differential trails whose probabilities are too low to be useful in the classical setting but large enough in the quantum setting. In this work, we present dedicated quantum free-start collision attacks on Hirose’s double block length compression function instantiated with AES-256, namely HCF-AES-256. The best publicly known classical attack against HCF-AES-256 covers up to 9 out of 14 rounds. We present a new 10-round differential trail for HCF-AES-256 with probability 2−160, and use it to find collisions with a quantum version of the rebound attack. Our attack succeeds with a time complexity of 285.11 and requires 216 qRAM in the quantum-attack setting, where an attacker can make only classical queries to the oracle and perform offline computations. We also present a quantum free-start collision attack on HCF-AES-256 with a time complexity of 286.07 which outperforms Chailloux, Naya-Plasencia, and Schrottenloher’s generic quantum collision attack (ASIACRYPT 2017) in a model when large qRAM is not available.

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