Epistemology, like ethics, is normative. Just as ethics addresses questions about how we ought to act, so epistemology addresses questions about how we ought to believe and enquire. We can also ask metanormative questions, like: What does it mean to claim that someone ought to do or believe something? Do such claims express beliefs about independently existing facts, or only attitudes of approval and disapproval towards certain pieces of conduct? How do putative facts about what people ought to do or believe fit in to the natural world? In the case of ethics, such questions have been subject to extensive and systematic investigation, yielding the thriving subdiscipline of metaethics. Yet the corresponding questions have had far less attention in epistemology. The present volume focuses on these questions and thus aims to promote the subdiscipline of metaepistemology. It brings together a collection of new essays drawing on the sophisticated theories and frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity, and examining whether they can be applied to epistemic normativity, and what this might tell us about both.