DO PANÓPTICO AO NEUROMARKETING

Ainda no século XVIII Jeremy Bentham idealizou a figura do panóptico como um mecanismo de alto controle e persuasão sobre os indivíduos. Geralmente aplicado em prisões, manicômios, escolas e, até mesmo nas fábricas, o panóptico consistia na construção de um local em forma de circunferência com uma torre de vigilância no centro para que os sujeitos enquanto objeto de controle e inspeção permanecessem constantemente sob as vistas do inspetor. Porém, na pós-modernidade, marcada por uma intensa revolução tecnológica e pela crise dos confinamentos, torna-se possível uma vigilância ainda mais profunda, capaz de ultrapassar os estritos limites espaciais de monitoramento e adentrar na própria psiquê e no cotidiano dos indivíduos, permitindo o seu controle em tempo integral. O modelo de panóptico Benthamiano é então aperfeiçoado e essa nova vigilância passa a ser exercida pelo panóptico digital, com a internet e o smartphone substituindo os espaços de confinamento sob a aparência de uma liberdade e uma comunicação ilimitadas. Nesse contexto, com a evolução do capitalismo diversas empresas têm migrado para plataformas e instituído negócios altamente lucrativos a partir do simples desenvolvimento de aplicativos. Uma dessas empresas é a Uber Technologies Inc. No discurso da Uber, os trabalhadores envolvidos já não são chamados de empregados, mas de “parceiros” que apenas se utilizam do aplicativo da empresa para intermediar seus serviços. Mas será que esse discurso procede? O presente ensaio tem enquanto problema averiguar se a empresa Uber não se utiliza do mecanismo do panóptico digital como forma de exercer controle, influência e vigilância sobre seus trabalhadores, porém, de uma forma mais discreta, mascarando o poder diretivo a medida em que transfere a vigilância física para a vigilância algorítmica. Em outras palavras, busca-se analisar se o elemento fático jurídico da subordinação na relação de emprego não estaria presente no modelo de organização da Uber a partir de uma vigilância panóptica. Para além, partindo da hipótese pela existência de um controle digital e, portanto, pela existência de vínculo, objetiva-se, em um segundo plano, averiguar se, e como, a empresa Uber consegue manipular esses trabalhadores e convencê-los a submeter-se e a manter-se em uma relação de trabalho completamente precarizante, partindo de uma análise do neuromarketing como instrumento de manipulação e captura da subjetividade. Acredita-se, que estas questões precisam ser analisadas e discutidas com cautela, sendo dotadas da maior relevância social e jurídica, a fim de que se evite a exploração sob a aparência de liberdade.

Foundations on Silt: Jeremy Bentham, Liberalism and the Science of International Law

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>

Foundations on Silt: Jeremy Bentham, Liberalism and the Science of International Law

<p>When the words good or bad are uttered the user generally takes their meaning derived from a system of ethics or morals. In this sense good and bad are particularist in nature and also socio-culturally specific. Let us take a simple example from Antiquity. At school in the West we learn of a figure called Alexander the Great, the Macedonian. By all accounts we are taught that he was a great, and by extension a good man. In modern day Iran Alexander of Macedonia is known as Alexander the Devil. So the question arises: was Alexander good or bad, or both? Is it possible to state unequivocally that the actions of Alexander were as a matter of fact morally good or morally bad? I think the answer to this question is fairly straightforward: it depends. Now this answer is not a simple descent into postmodern territory and moral relativism; there are genuine and empirical reasons to believe all three possibilities pertaining to the actions of Alexander. In short it is not possible to extrapolate from the particular to the general and it is not a question of semantics or even of critical hermeneutics. There is no either/or for Alexander of Macedonia. The binary opposition of good and bad cannot be applied to the particular actions of an individual and furthermore cannot be generalized as a principle, rule or otherwise. This distinction or argument between what can be deemed good and what can be deemed bad may at first sight seem irrelevant to the law but it is not. In moral philosophy natural law theory states that law is based on morality, therefore negating the possibility of a bad law. It is at this point that Jeremy Bentham comes to our attention. Bentham believed that law and morality, although connected need not necessarily be so. Under the principle of utility, which I will explore in more detail later in this essay, Bentham believed that individual intent of an action could be disassociated from the intent that ought to be in place. The principle of utility was this test. In other words when determining the right course of action and what laws should be obeyed for all circumstances and systems, the principle of utility was the foundation. And I will argue later on in this essay that although Bentham is identified as a legal positivist and a philosophical realist his negative idealism is based on an error, much in the same way that he thought he had identified the fallacy of natural law. Bentham’s foundations may not be on stilts but perhaps, more accurately, they were built on silt. Moreover Bentham’s position as a moral philosopher is rather unusual in that although he was indeed interested in the behavior of the individual he was insofar as that behavior might have some bearing on a general system of law. This essay is therefore concerned with this troubling problem. I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will give an overview of Bentham’s criticism of natural law and of William Blackstone in particular. Secondly, I will look at Bentham’s contribution to the internationalization of the law and his use of the “principle of utility”; he coined the neologism “international” as one of many. I will then move on to see how Bentham expected to actualize his foundational principle through his efforts to persuade others of the efficacy of codifying international law as a form of ‘science’. I conclude by arguing that Bentham’s philosophical realism was, in fact a form of idealism, bordering on the religious; his ‘cosmic calculus’.</p>

LA ÉTICA UTILITARISTA DE JEREMY BENTHAM: DEL SER AL DEBER SER

Jeremy Bentham es unánimemente reconocido como un filósofo político y del derecho de primera fila; también es muy reconocido como economista o teórico de la economía; desde luego, es considerado como uno de los grandes reformadores sociales del siglo XIX; incluso, recientemente, desde el último cuarto del siglo XX, ha comenzado a ser visto como uno de los grandes expertos clásicos en historia de la sexualidad y como un pensador radical en este ámbito. Pero ¿fue Bentham un gran filósofo, especialmente un gran filósofo moral?

History and Historiography in Classical Utilitarianism, 1800–1865

This first comprehensive account of the utilitarians' historical thought intellectually resituates their conceptions of philosophy and politics, at a time when the past acquired new significances as both a means and object of study. Drawing on published and unpublished writings - and set against the intellectual backdrops of Scottish philosophical history, German and French historicism, romanticism, positivism, and the rise of social science and scientific history - Callum Barrell recovers the depth with which Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, George Grote, and John Stuart Mill thought about history as a site of philosophy and politics. He argues that the utilitarians, contrary to their reputations as ahistorical and even antihistorical thinkers, developed complex frameworks in which to learn from and negotiate the past, inviting us to rethink the foundations of their ideas, as well as their place in - and relationship to - nineteenth-century philosophy and political thought.

Towards Fully Purposing Universities to Deliver Public Benefit

In leadership positions at UCL, we have spent more than a decade seeking to fulfil our university's founding commitment—inspired almost two centuries ago by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham—to innovation, accessibility, and relevance for the benefit of humanity. Our guiding principle has been to make our institution and its activities greater than the sum of its parts. To enable us to have most impact in “sustainable human progress,” we have focused our approach on cross-disciplinarity—by which we mean collaboration between experts in different disciplines that transcends subject boundaries—because the problems faced by society cannot be solved by research from one discipline alone. In recent years we have come to understand the boundaries between disciplines to be a subset of the many types of barriers—such as those between communities (disciplinary, academic and otherwise) and between different kinds of activity—that can inhibit the fulfilment of our vision to maximise our public benefit. In order to address crucial challenges—from the local to the global—we need to form collaborations across society that increase our mutual knowledge and engagement. We need to understand how the translation and application of knowledge will change in different settings and according to different practicalities. And we need to better reflect and enhance our role as convenors of different stakeholders to promote greater shared dialogue, co-creation and action.