scholarly journals Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Wroński
Keyword(s):  
Objective Consequentialism

Response to Carlson and Qizilbash

Utilitas ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Howard-Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Objective Consequentialism

In ‘The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism’ I argued against objective consequentialism on the grounds that it requires us to do what we cannot do and hence violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Erik Carlson and Mozaffar Qizilbash have raised objections to my arguments, chiefly by distinguishing different senses of ‘can’ and ‘ought’. I here attempt to rebut those challenges.

Consequences for Non-consequentialists

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
ONORA O'NEILL
Keyword(s):  
Moral Luck ◽  
Ethical Reasoning ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Objective Consequentialism

Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical reasoning have difficulties in accounting for the value of consequences. Taken neat, consequentialism is too fierce in its emphasis on success and disregard of luck, while non-consequentialism seemingly over-values inner states and undervalues actual results. In Uneasy Virtue Julia Driver proposes a form of objective consequentialism which claims that characters are good if they typically (but not invariably) produce good results. This position addresses the problems moral luck raises for consequentialism, but requires some form of realism about traits of character. However, if our knowledge of mental states is ascriptive, this form of objective consequentialism may make excessive demands. Non-consequentialists may gain in so far as the theories of action to which they are typically committed are less demanding, and are built to take account of the typical or systematic connections between states of character and results of action.

The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism: A Comment

Utilitas ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash
Keyword(s):  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Objective Consequentialism

Frances Howard-Snyder argues that objective consequentialism should be rejected because it violates the principle of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ in asking us to do what we cannot. In this comment I suggest that Howard-Snyder does not take sufficiently seriously the chief defence of objective consequentialism, which reformulates it so that it applies only to actions we can perform. Nonetheless, I argue that there are arguments relating to ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ which discredit objective consequentialism even if it is thus reformulated. These arguments also cause problems for a reformulated version of subjective consequentialism.

The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism

Utilitas ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Howard-Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
The Future ◽  
Objective Consequentialism

Objective consequentialism is often criticized because it is impossible to know which of our actions will have the best consequences. Why exactly does this undermine objective consequentialism? I offer a new link between the claim that our knowledge of the future is limited and the rejection of objective consequentialism: that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and we cannot produce the best consequences available to us. I support this apparently paradoxical contention by way of an analogy. I cannot beat Karpov at chess in spite of the fact that I can make each of many series of moves, at least one of which would beat him. I then respond to a series of objections. In the process I develop an account of the ‘can’ of ability. I conclude with some remarks about the bearing this attack has on subjective consequentialism.

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