Recent Issues in High-Level Perception

Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high-level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach.

Drivers of plate waste: A mini theory of action based on staff observations

Restaurants waste one fifth of the food they buy; much is left behind on people's plates (Engström & Carlsson-Kanyama, 2004). Plate waste forces restaurants to buy more food than necessary, and to pay for food waste disposal; and burdens the environment, with agriculture “a dominant force behind…climate change” (Foley et al., 2011, p.337).Plate waste is under-researched in tourism (Gössling & Peeters, 2015), with buffets being particularly wasteful (15 g per person per day at breakfast; Juvan, Grün, & Dolnicar, 2018). Only two measures are proven to reduce plate waste at hotel buffets: smaller plates, and explaining to guests that getting seconds is better than taking too much at once (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2013). Social science theories underlie these effective practical measures: the idea of plate size reduction stems from obesity theory; and inviting patrons back leverages social norms. The present study develops a new “mini-theory of action” (Rossiter, 2011, p.119) to inform the development a wider range of practical measures for plate waste reduction. Mini-theories of action formulate possible reasons for human behaviour, opening these hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships up for empirical testing in real behavioural contexts (Rossiter, 2011). Mini-theories of action, arguably, are the starting point for any new social science theory. As such, our study's contribution is primarily theoretical. Pathways to practical impact are discussed.We conducted unstructured interviews with 10 chefs and 23 waiters/waitresses (of varying gender and work experience) in three four-star rated hotels serving buffet-style meals to 300–1200 guests daily. We asked why guests leave uneaten food behind. Service staff observe and talk to guests daily, frequently checking if they are finished. In response, guests offer explanations why some food remains uneaten. Chefs design menus to minimize food waste. We identify specific drivers of plate waste, and seven overarching themes.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7

This is the seventh volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (OSAR), and the fifth drawn from papers presented at the New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR, November 14–16, 2019). The OSAR series is devoted to publishing cutting edge, interdisciplinary work on the wide array of topics falling under the general rubric of ‘agency and responsibility.’ In this volume, roughly half of the chapters focus on agency, and half focus on responsibility. In the former camp, there are essays about the non-observational knowledge we have about our current intentional actions, constitutivism, answerability, organizational agency, socially embedded agency, and a brain sciences critique of causal theories of action. In the latter camp, there are essays about praise, guilt, blame, sanction, forgiveness, and disclaimers.

Intentional Action

The project of analyzing intentional action has been out of favor for some time. In part this is due to exhaustion over details—accounts are usually subject to very technical problems or elaborate counterexamples. This chapter builds build on the earlier accounts of control and non-deviance to offer a new account of intentional action. This account builds on Mele and Moser’s influential work, and goes beyond it in some ways. After offering the account, this chapter considers a range of ancillary issues and problem cases. It discusses, for example, side-effect cases, senseless movements, the role of belief and knowledge in intentional action, and action theoretic versions of systematic Gettier cases. Finally, it turns to issues of reductionism that motivate some rejections of causal theories of action. The upshot is that anti-causalists have a new account to contend with, and one that has answers to the problems often thought to be damning for causalism.

Analytische Strafrechtswissenschaft

The treatises in this volume are united by the wish to contribute to an analysis of the “grammar” of the general doctrine of criminal offense, this is to help clarifying the rules under which we can state what can be said reasonably in a language that constitutes the criminal offense. This method of penology is working by logical, semantic and pragmatic analysis of the elements of the criminal offense and involves the modern theories of action, norms and causality.

Witgenstein on intention and theory of action

In the article we examine Wittgenstein's notes on several action theories in general context of intentional states. We show (based on the articles of Michael Scott) that the kinesthetic theory of action and theories of innervation, which were the object of criticism of Wittgenstein, do not play an essential role for understanding Wittgenstein's texts and therefore in this case the influence of historical and philosophical reconstruction on the understanding of Wittgenstein's corresponding notes can be considered insignificant. Late Wittgenstein's texts are directed against comparatively universal methodological and metaphysical principles. And therefore, criticism of theories of action can only serve as an optional illustration and an optional precondition for interpretation and understanding.

Action

Chapter 4 argues that, as in the case of substance, prominent accounts of action rightly insist on—but fail to meet—the explanatory demand with regard to action: what is it in virtue of which an action is an action? This failure is observed both in the case of causal theories of action (represented by Davidson and his followers) and in the case of rival non-causal theories (represented by Anscombe and her followers). This chapter then appeals to a Bradleyan regress argument to show that—as in the case of substance—such a failure is inevitable as long as one assumes that one is dealing with differentiated or relational action. The only remedy is to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to action: there are no actions, not even one action, there is simply action, analogous to actus purus in Aquinas’ sense.