Color Relationalism, Ordinary Illusion, and Color Incompatibility

Philosophia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 1085-1097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pendaran Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Color Incompatibility ◽  
Color Relationalism

scholarly journals Chromatic layering and color relationalism

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-301
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Color Relationalism

scholarly journals Quality-Space Functionalism about Color

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 138-164
Author(s):  
Jacob Berger ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Color Experience ◽  
Functionalist Account ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
Color Relationalism ◽  
Color Physicalism

I motivate and defend a previously underdeveloped functionalist account of the metaphysics of color, a view that I call ‘quality-space functionalism’ about color. Although other theorists have proposed varieties of color functionalism, this view differs from such accounts insofar as it identifies and individuates colors by their relative locations within a particular kind of so-called ‘quality space’ that reflects creatures’ capacities to discriminate visually among stimuli. My arguments for this view of color are abductive: I propose that quality-space functionalism best captures our commonsense conception of color, fits with many experimental findings, coheres with the phenomenology of color experience, and avoids many issues for standard theories of color such as color physicalism and color relationalism.

scholarly journals Color Relationalism and Relativism

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-192
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne ◽  
David R. Hilbert
Keyword(s):  
Color Relationalism

scholarly journals Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (58) ◽  
pp. 405-430
Author(s):  
John Bolender
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Scales ◽  
Color Incompatibility

After Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein realized that elementary propositions may logically conflict with each other, due to the fact that the most elementary measurements may contradict each other. This led to the view that logic consists of various calculi. A calculus consists of measurement scales, each scale being a rule for the application of numbers. These scales determine logical relationships between elementary propositions by reason of arithmetical relations. Attempts to reject Wittgenstein's change in viewpoint, which ignore the relevance of measurement and arithmetic, are remiss. In this light, I discuss Sarah Moss’s criticism of intermediate Wittgenstein.

scholarly journals Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Disputatio ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (31) ◽  
pp. 235-237
Author(s):  
Brian Kierland
Keyword(s):  
Traditional View ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Color Incompatibility

Abstract A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

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