Dynamic monopoly pricing with network externalities

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 837-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Bensaid ◽  
Jean-Philippe Lesne
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly

Dynamic Monopoly Pricing Under a Poisson-Type Uncertain Demand

1992 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Min Chen ◽  
Dipak C. Jain
Keyword(s):  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly ◽  
Poisson Type

A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities

2014 ◽  
Vol 124 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaito Hashimoto ◽  
Nobuo Matsubayashi
Keyword(s):  
Consumption Externalities ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly

Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 910-928 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subir Bose ◽  
Gerhard Orosel ◽  
Marco Ottaviani ◽  
Lise Vesterlund
Keyword(s):  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly

scholarly journals Monopoly pricing with network externalities

1999 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis M.B Cabral ◽  
David J Salant ◽  
Glenn A Woroch
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Monopoly Pricing

scholarly journals A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1642-1672 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Glen Weyl
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Price Regulation ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Price Theory ◽  
General Measure ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Two Sided Markets

I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers. (JEL D42, D85, L14)

scholarly journals Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Lambertini ◽  
Raimondello Orsini
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly

scholarly journals Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (5) ◽  
pp. 1706-1719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Dudine ◽  
Igal Hendel ◽  
Alessandro Lizzeri
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly ◽  
Coase Conjecture ◽  
Demand Changes ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Over Time

We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the case of storable goods, the stockpiling motive has recently been documented empirically. We show that, in this environment, if the monopolist cannot commit, then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the literature on the Coase conjecture.

scholarly journals Network Externalities in a Dynamic Monopoly

2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (8) ◽  
pp. 99-104
Author(s):  
Luca Lambertini ◽  
Raimondello Orsini
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly

Capacity expansion and dynamic monopoly pricing

2006 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 169-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Demichelis ◽  
O. Tarola
Keyword(s):  
Capacity Expansion ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Dynamic Monopoly
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