Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games

2019 ◽  
Vol 175 ◽  
pp. 40-42
Author(s):  
Chuyi Fang ◽  
Bin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Distributions

The marriage lemma and large anonymous games with countable actions

1995 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ali Khan ◽  
Yeneng Sun
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Short Proof ◽  
Equilibrium Distributions ◽  
Anonymous Games

AbstractWe give a particularly short proof of the symmetrization of Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions in large anonymous games with countable actions. Our proof relies on the Bollobás-Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma.

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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