Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 104 ◽  
pp. 131-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Martin
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yulei Luo ◽  
Jun Nie ◽  
Gaowang Wang ◽  
Eric R. Young
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Sebastian Gryglewicz ◽  
Aaron Kolb
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mogens Fosgerau ◽  
Rajiv Sethi ◽  
Jorgen W. Weibull
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3225-3255
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hébert ◽  
Michael Woodford

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. This second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings. (JEL C70, D11, D82, D83, D91)


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document