scholarly journals Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

2013 ◽  
Vol 148 (6) ◽  
pp. 2195-2222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Andrew McLennan
Keyword(s):  
Stationary Equilibrium ◽  
Coalitional Bargaining

scholarly journals An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures

2004 ◽  
Vol 88 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 783-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Antonio Merlo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Coalitional Bargaining

scholarly journals A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium

2019 ◽  
Vol 305 ◽  
pp. 83-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen ◽  
Mikhail Raskin
Keyword(s):  
Stationary Equilibrium ◽  
Set Game

Stationary Equilibrium of a Toroidal Plasma

1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. S. Viswanathan
Keyword(s):  
Stationary Equilibrium ◽  
Toroidal Plasma

Optimal Financial Exclusion

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-134
Author(s):  
Cyril Monnet ◽  
Erwan Quintin
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Equilibrium Path ◽  
Stationary Equilibrium ◽  
Benchmark Model ◽  
Strategic Default ◽  
Financial Exclusion ◽  
Natural Variations

We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium conditional on the level of incentives provided by the threat of exclusion. We argue that these results are robust to a host of natural variations on our benchmark model. (JEL C73, D53, D86, G21, G32, G51)

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