scholarly journals A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium

2019 ◽  
Vol 305 ◽  
pp. 83-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen ◽  
Mikhail Raskin
1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. S. Viswanathan

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-134
Author(s):  
Cyril Monnet ◽  
Erwan Quintin

We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium conditional on the level of incentives provided by the threat of exclusion. We argue that these results are robust to a host of natural variations on our benchmark model. (JEL C73, D53, D86, G21, G32, G51)


2013 ◽  
Vol 148 (6) ◽  
pp. 2195-2222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Andrew McLennan

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 8933
Author(s):  
José M. Gamonales ◽  
Jesús Muñoz-Jiménez ◽  
Kiko León ◽  
Sergio J. Ibáñez

Research on Football 5-a-side for blind people is usually informative and does not often consider sports performance analysis. This study aimed to verify the existing differences between the 2014 World Championship of Fa5 and the 2016 Paralympic Games, analyzing the action for an effective game, the throws to the goal. For this purpose, a total of 52 matches were analyzed and the statistical analysis unit was all the throws made to the goal during the game (n = 2.227). A descriptive and differential analysis was made between the variables proposed in the study considering the type of competition. The results show the existence of differences between the championships, analyzed explicitly through the variables: Championship phases, Throwing moment, Match status, Starting zone, and Throwing result, as well as the variables Progression type, Throwing zone, Striking situation, Corporal zone, and Striking type. These results highlighted that teams played differently but also set game trends and styles for future competitions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 889-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérôme Renault ◽  
Bruno Ziliotto

We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.


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