Emissions trading and firm innovation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 155 ◽  
pp. 119989 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenggang Ren ◽  
Yucai Hu ◽  
Jingjing Zheng ◽  
Yangjie Wang
Author(s):  
Shenggang Ren ◽  
Yucai Hu ◽  
Jingjing Zheng ◽  
Yangjie Wang ◽  
Shanjun Li

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Feng ◽  
Xingshu Zhu ◽  
Yu Gu ◽  
Yuecheng Liu

Based on the natural experiment of carbon emissions trading pilots in China, this paper investigates the effect of environmental regulation on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that: 1) Market-incentivized environmental regulation significantly increase the level of corporate tax avoidance. 2) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is more obvious on the non-state-owned firms, firms with severe financing constraints, and firms in highly competitive industries. 3) We find that the reduction of cash flow is the channel for environmental regulation to affect corporate tax avoidance. 4) Further analysis shows that government subsidies can alleviate the enhancement of tax avoidance by environmental regulation. The more government subsidies a company receives, the less tax avoidance it has.


2021 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 501-512
Author(s):  
Shasha Liu ◽  
Mianmian Ji ◽  
Huijuan Wang

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 989-1024 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov ◽  
Syed Walid Reza ◽  
Yanhui Wu

We hypothesize that political activism is valuable because it helps reduce political uncertainty, which, in turn, fosters firm innovation. We find that firms that support more politicians, winning politicians, politicians on congressional committees with jurisdictional authority over the firms’ industries, and politicians who join those committees innovate more. We employ a natural experiment to show a causal effect of political activism on innovation. We also show evidence of intra-industry and geographical political activism spillovers.


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