Optimal R&D policy and endogenous quality choice

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 1159-1178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (8) ◽  
pp. 1259-1277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñigo Herguera ◽  
Praveen Kujal ◽  
Emmanuel Petrakis

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 956-995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Crawford ◽  
Oleksandr Shcherbakov ◽  
Matthew Shum

We measure the welfare distortions from endogenous quality choice in imperfectly competitive markets. For US cable television markets between 1997–2006, prices are 33 percent to 74 percent higher and qualities 23 percent to 55 percent higher than socially optimal. Such quality overprovision contradicts classic results in the literature and our analysis shows that it results from the presence of competition from high-end satellite TV providers: without the competitive pressure from satellite companies, cable TV monopolists would instead engage in quality degradation. For welfare, quality overprovision implies cable customers would prefer smaller, lower-quality cable bundles at a lower price, amounting to a twofold increase in consumer surplus for the average consumer. (JEL L13, L15, L82)


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