P20-21 A functional role of the inferior frontal cortex in belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: an rTMS study

2010 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. S224-S225
Author(s):  
T. Tsujii ◽  
S. Masuda ◽  
K. Sakatani ◽  
T. Akiyama ◽  
S. Watanabe
2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (7) ◽  
pp. 2005-2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takeo Tsujii ◽  
Sayako Masuda ◽  
Takekazu Akiyama ◽  
Shigeru Watanabe

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veith Weilnhammer ◽  
Merve Fritsch ◽  
Meera Chikermane ◽  
Anna-Lena Eckert ◽  
Katharina Kanthak ◽  
...  

Cortex ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (10) ◽  
pp. 2861-2874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Jakuszeit ◽  
Sonja A. Kotz ◽  
Anna S. Hasting

Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Simon J. Handley ◽  
Alison M. Bacon

In this study, we examine the role of beliefs in conditional inference in two experiments, demonstrating a robust tendency for people to make fewer inferences from statements they disbelieve, regardless of logical validity. The main purpose of this study was to test whether participants are able to inhibit this belief effect where it constitutes a bias. This is the case when participants are specifically instructed to assume the truth of the premises. However, Experiment 1 showed that the effect is no less marked than when this instruction is given, than when it is not, although higher ability participants did show slightly less influence of belief (Experiment 2). Contrary to the findings with syllogistic reasoning, use of speeded tasks had no effect on the extent of the belief bias (both experiments), although it did considerably reduce the numbers of inferences that were drawn overall. These findings suggest that the belief bias in conditional inference is less open to volitional control than that associated with syllogistic reasoning.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 529-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliana V. Baldo ◽  
Nina F. Dronkers

Author(s):  
Veith Weilnhammer ◽  
Merve Fritsch ◽  
Meera Chikermane ◽  
Anna-Lena Eckert ◽  
Katharina Kanthak ◽  
...  

2AbstractIn the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, it has remained controversial whether prefrontal cortex determines what is consciously experienced or, alternatively, serves only complementary functions such as introspection or action.Here, we provide converging evidence from computational modeling and two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments for a key role of inferior frontal cortex in detecting perceptual conflicts that emerge from ambiguous sensory information. Crucially, the detection of perceptual conflicts by prefrontal cortex turned out to be critical in the process of transforming ambiguous sensory information into unambiguous conscious experiences: In a third experiment, disruption of neural activity in inferior frontal cortex through transcranial magnetic stimulation slowed down the updating of conscious experience that occurs in response to perceptual conflicts.These findings show that inferior frontal cortex actively contributes to the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. Prefrontal cortex is thus causally involved in determining the contents of conscious experience.3One-sentence SummaryInferior frontal cortex detects and resolves perceptual conflict during bistable perception.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Holbrook ◽  
Marco Iacoboni ◽  
Chelsea Gordon ◽  
Shannon Proksch ◽  
Harmony Makhfi ◽  
...  

Harm to some elicits greater sympathy than harm to others. Here, we examine the role of posterior medial frontal cortex (PMFC) in regulating sympathy, and explore the potential role of PMFC in the related phenomena of mentalizing and representing others as connected with oneself. We down-regulated either PMFC or a control region (middle temporal visual area), then assessed feelings of sympathy for and self-other overlap with two characters described as having suffered physical harm, and who were framed as adversarial or affiliative, respectively. We also measured mentalizing performance with regard to inferring the cognitive and affective states of the adversarial character. As hypothesized, down-regulating PMFC increased sympathy for both characters. Whereas we had predicted that down-regulating PMFC would decrease mentalizing ability given the postulated role of PMFC in the mentalizing network, participants in the PMFC down-regulation condition evinced greater second-order cognitive inference ability relative to controls. We observed no effect of the TMS manipulation on self-other overlap, although sympathy and self-other overlap were positively correlated. These findings are discussed as they may inform understanding of the functional role(s) of PMFC in regulating responses broadly linked with empathy.


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