The Battle of the Atlantic

2021 ◽  
pp. 427-483
1948 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Theodore Ropp ◽  
Samuel Eliot Morison ◽  
Wesley Frank Craven ◽  
James Lee Gate ◽  
Air Historical Office ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2024-2036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Symons ◽  
James Delgado ◽  
Deborah Marx ◽  
Erika Martin Seibert

ABSTRACT In May 2013, per Congressional direction and to support a better understanding of pollution sources in the U. S. waters, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provided the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) a detailed report on the assessment of risks from potentially polluting shipwrecks. The report, Risk Assessment for Potentially Polluting Wrecks in U.S. Waters, was a result of the Remediation of Underwater Legacy Environmental Threats (RULET) project that evaluated 20,000 shipwrecks for their pollution potential as well as issues that could impact operations including whether or not those wrecks could be historically significant properties and/or gravesites. “Historic property” is defined by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), to be any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclusion in, the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP.) The NHPA requires a Federal agency to “take into account” the effects of its undertakings, such as pollution removal from a submerged shipwreck, and afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) a reasonable opportunity to comment. Federal agencies meet Section 106 responsibilities through a consultation process with the ACHP and other parties as set out in the ACHP's regulations implementing Section 106 of the NHPA (36 CFR Part 800), or through implementation of the nationwide 1997 Programmatic Agreement for emergency response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. NOAA evaluated a number of the report's shipwrecks for eligibility under the NRHP criteria to determine if any could be considered historic properties. The majority of RULET sites are associated with World War II casualties in the Battle of the Atlantic. As of 2013, the average age of each wreck is 83 years old, as many were built or retrofitted for service during WWII, meeting one of the criteria, per the National Park Service's regulations at 36 CFR Part 60 for eligibility for nomination to the NRHP. Three potentially eligible shipwrecks were subsequently nominated and accepted to the NRHP. The information contained in the RULET risk assessments and the NRHP nominations, facilitates the efforts of USCG to work through the required consultation processes; more effectively balancing responsibilities to address potential environmental impacts and legal mandates to avoid or mitigate impacts to historic resources.


Author(s):  
G. H. Bennett

Since 1945, the U-boat campaign has dominated the attention of scholars of the Battle of the Atlantic, and in the popular imagination 1943 remains the year in which the U-boat campaign turned decisively against Germany. That interpretation has been increasingly challenged by historians. However, many historians have completely overlooked a set of convoy battles in late 1943 that did mark a decisive turning point in the war at sea. Those battles were not fought in the Atlantic, but along the English coast from September to December. They marked the eclipse of the German Schnellboot as a serious threat to British coastal shipping, just at the point where the build-up to D-Day meant that the coastal convoys had an added strategic value in terms of the outcome of the Second World War. This chapter by G.H. Bennett examines why the German campaign against Britain's coastal convoys collapsed in 1943, and challenges an existing historiography which has failed to identify the coastal campaign as an integral part of the Battle of the Atlantic.


Author(s):  
Marc Milner

This chapter by Marc Milner challenges the popular perception of the "Battle of the Atlantic" as a shooting war, and the notion that Allied strategy was impaired by the depredations of Germany's U-boats. He asserts that the Atlantic war of 1939-45 is better understood like the great maritime wars of the age of sail, in which battle played a small part in the larger struggle for resource accumulation and the application of power ashore. The British and Canadians understood the Atlantic war in precisely this way, and focused on avoidance of the enemy as their primary method of defending shipping. In contrast, the USN followed a Mahanian concept of naval warfare in which destruction of the enemy was the underlying concept of escort operations. In this "new" paradigm, the Allied (really British) victory over the U-boats in 1943 was not something that could be achieved quickly. Rather, like the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, it was the culmination of a long process that forced the enemy to stand and fight in a campaign he had already lost.


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