Introduction: The historical interpretation of mathematical texts and the problem of anachronism

Author(s):  
Niccolò Guicciardini
Author(s):  
Simon Morgan Wortham

This chapter concentrates on Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, where the Hegelian theme of mutual recognition as the origin of man’s self-consciousness and potential freedom is tested against the complex circumstances of colonialism. Fanon’s idea that the ‘Negro slave’ is recognized by the ‘White Master’ in a situation that is ‘without conflict’ suggests a possibly double, or self-resistant, meaning: the colonial situation after slavery ushers in something like a phony war; but also colonialism’s historical interpretation is not exhausted by the Hegelian master-slave logic. Through this double possibility of the colonial, one wonders whether after Hegel it is historical interpretation or the historical process itself that has gone awry. Such dynamic tensions suggest an impossibly divided dialectics at work throughout Fanon’s corpus. The section of Fanon’s ‘The Negro and Recognition’ devoted to a critique of Adler points to an earlier footnote in Black Skin, White Masks which offers a lengthy engagement with Lacan, allowing us to reread the politics of racial difference into the scene of the Lacanian mirror-stage. Here, the resistant ‘other’ of psychoanalysis unlocks the possibility of another ‘politics’ capable of addressing, by better recognising, some of its most significant impasses.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Graham

1960 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-270
Author(s):  
H. William Rodemann

1993 ◽  
Vol 49 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J.J. Botha

Understanding a text always demands knowledge of its context. Possible reasons why context is frequently regarded as a subordinate part of interpretation are analysed. Interpretation within a communicative perspective, and facets of contextualisation are discussed; some theoretical aspects concerning contextual issues are clarified. The notion ‘framing the text’ is defended to emphasise that history is constructed and always p re supposes a perspective. Framing is a comprehensive activity which adds complexity. Because it engages in historical interpretation and describes aspects of the various levels of context, one’s framing activity can be criticised and improved. Framing arises from oscillation between intensive interpretation of details and generalisation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-393
Author(s):  
Naomi Choi

AbstractTo answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it.


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