From Re- to Pre- and Back Again

Tracing the complex history of the term ‘reenactment’, back to R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy of history, on the one hand, and popular practices of war reenactments and living history museums, on the other, a survey of its current contribution in art and museum practices highlights the importance of historicity — a category the postmodern was supposed to have vacated — in a wide range of examples, from Rod Dickinson and Jeremey Deller to Alexandra Pirici, Manuel Pelmuş, and Milo Rau. Performance reenactments, in particular, are premised on performance art having become historical, but also threaten to digest history in favour of a mere productivist mobilization for the needs of current attention economies. An alternative could be the attempt to counter historical with dramatic time in order to unlock unrealized possibilities and futures, as the term preenactment promises.

Figural Co-Production

The aim of this article is to provide a critical revision of the notion of “reception” of academic works in general and of the histories of the sciences in particular. This will broaden the scope of the notion in a way that can include the new and unexpected receptions of the history of science in Latin America. To achieve this, I propose the concept of “figural co-production”, which I understand as a set of situated practices where the available cultural resources are appropriated, and that allows for productive interactions between heterogeneous collectives that aim for the configuration of knowledge. This theoretical proposal enables me to analyze Verónica Tozzi Thompson’s appropriation of the works of Steven Shapin and Martin Kusch in her pragmatist approach to the philosophy of history. This appropriation, I contend, can be seen as a case of reception of the shapinian history of science in Argentina.

Dyskretny urok burżuazji u schyłku wielkiego konania. Czas, pamięć i cywilizacja w dwóch powieściach Tomasza Manna – Buddenbrookowie. Dzieje upadku rodziny oraz Czarodziejska góra

The paper aims to juxtapose and compare the notions of temporality, memory and civilization in Thomas Mann’s two seminal novels: Buddenbrooks and The Magic Mountain. It sheds light on a range of Mann’s topics and motives, such as the tension between cyclic and linear time in the bourgeois milieu, the artefact mediated memory, the unobvious relationship of familial and social history and the role that fate plays within them, possible concepts of temporality in a metaphorically ill and weakened civilization. These analyses serve the aim of sketching out a philosophy of history which Mann tacitly but steadily employs throughout his oeuvre.

A Commentary on Ambedkar's Posthumously Published "Philosophy of Hinduism"- Part III

This article forms part III of a running commentary on Ambedkar’s posthumously published “Philosophy of History” (Ambedkar, 2014a). We attempt to follow Ambedkar’s reflections on the early origins of religion and his initial distinctions of the religions of “savage society” and “civilized society” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 9). Using the tools of philosophical critique, we see his attempt to dissect the real “principal” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 10) of religion beyond the apparitional nature of rites, rituals, and taboos. This leads to a series of deductions of what constitutes the very “core,” “source,” and “substance” of religion rooted in the “preservation of life” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 10). However, this is also a moment that will foreshadow Ambedkar’s ultimate judgement of Hinduism’s status as a religion when founded on the unequal social structure of caste. We argue the following in this article: what Ambedkar says about the architectonic of “savage society” and the failure to undergo a profound revolution in the nature and concept of religion bears an eerie resemblance to what ultimately takes the place of “savage society” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 9) over time, namely the Hindu caste system. This makes modern Hinduism a strange hybrid of pre-history and a future history whose conclusion is uncertain. Whether caste can disappear from society is the burning question. And this is intertwined with profound metaphysical questions of time, life, birth, and death, which only philosophy can deconstruct if a religion, like Hinduism, were submitted for critical judgement. The article concludes with an attempt to set the stage for the next phase of the commentary: there Ambedkar will transition from a general discussion about the philosophy and history of religion as a concept to an actual engagement with the philosophical contents of the religion known and practiced by hundreds of millions of adherents as Hinduism. As we already know, his conclusion is dire: a religion can only be true if it is rooted in ‘justice’ and serves the ‘utility’ of individual freedom (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 22).

COMPREHENSION OF THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY R.G. COLLINGWOOD

Теория исторического познания Р.Дж. Коллингвуда выстраивается на основе методики воспроизведения интеллектуального опыта человека прошлого в современном контексте. Такой подход отводит ключевую роль в процессе исследования прошлого рефлексии историка, работа которой ориентирована на осмысление исторических свидетельств. В результате развития этих идей складывается представление о присущем историческому познанию характере опыта, отличающегося принципиальной незавершенностью, изменчивостью и способностью к самосовершенствованию. The theory of historical knowledge by R.G. Collingwood is built on the basis of the method of reenactment the intellectual experience of a person of the past in a modern context. This approach assigns a key role in the process of studying the past to the historian's reflection, whose work is focused on comprehending historical evidence. As a result of the development of these ideas formed the conception of historical knowledge that has a nature of experience, characterized by fundamental incompleteness, variability and the ability to selfimprovement.

Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, Czy historia i filologia mogą umiejętnie rozwiązać swoje zadanie bez ścisłego związku z filozofią, a mianowicie z filozofią historii i filozofią języka?

Can History and Philology Competently Address Their Tasks without a Close Connection with Philosophy, Namely Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Language? The thesis by Jan Baudouin de Courtenay published here is probably the oldest of the texts by the Polish linguist. The text was submitted in 1864 as a part of the logic and philosophy course taught at the Warsaw Main School by Henryk Struve. It clearly shows an attempt by the young researcher to embark on a scholarly path, which turns out to be far from the one Baudouin de Courtenay took later in his academic activity. The future linguist argues here in defence of linguistics as a so-called physical science (a natural skill, as he often calls it in his dissertation), thus contrasting it with philology and history.

History as engagement: The Historical Epistemology of Raymond Aron

Raymond Aron was a student of Léon Brunschvicg, a representative of French historical epistemology. This article explores Aron’s relation to this tradition through three claims. First of all, it contests that Raymond Aron’s philosophy of history constituted a complete break with this tradition. Secondly, resituating Aron in this tradition is valuable, because it highlights how Aron’s own philosophy of history is to be understood as a normative project, seen as an alternative to that of Brunschvicg. Finally, Aron’s philosophy can still hold valuable lessons for present-day historical epistemology and history and philosophy of science in general.

Tolstoy’s War and Peace: Philosophy of History Defamiliarized

Tolstoy’s War and Peace asserts an opposition to the discourse of philosophy of history and of any theorizing of human life because of the complexity of events, the possibilities not realized, and the insignificance of our moment in time and space. Without that sort of consideration of the possibility that human events cannot be theorized, explained, correctly narrated, or anticipated, we may miss our chance to cast off the burden of philosophy of history (in the interest of life), or at least to perceive that it is a burden.