‘The ethics of belief’ and belief about ethics: William Kingdon Clifford at the Metaphysical Society

2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROSE ANN CHRISTIAN

AbstractAs a member of the Victorian-era Metaphysical Society, W. K. Clifford contributed to debate about the prospects for morality in the absence of religion. Clifford thought its chances good. He presented a paper offering a ‘scientific’ approach to moral theory. In my discussion, I explore his proposal, using it to gain interpretative leverage on a paper he delivered before the Society only a year later, ‘The ethics of belief’. I set aside the quarrel with religion so prominent in this influential essay and discount its evidentialist epistemology, the better to reveal it for what it is: a powerful exercise in moral suasion.

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-108
Author(s):  
Rik Peels

At the end of the nineteenth century, in his famous essay ‘The Ethics of Belief’ the well-known mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon Clifford offered a powerful argument against religious beliefs. This article first gives an extensive analysis of Clifford’s evidentialist argument by placing it against the background of his evidentialist epistemology. Second, some arguments of William James, Clifford’s most famous critic, are expounded and criticised. Although there is some plausibility to these arguments, they are insufficient to refute Clifford’s evidentialism. Third, the author presents some problems for Clifford’s evidentialism, having to do with evidentialism as a moral thesis and with doxastic involuntarism, and offers some new arguments against Clifford’s evidentialist argument. Clifford’s argument against belief in God, as it stands, turns out to be untenable.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler

James’ The Will to Believe is the most influential writing in the ethics of belief. In it, James defends the right and rationality to believe on non-evidential grounds. James’ argument is directed against Clifford’s “Evidentialism” presented in The Ethics of Belief in which Clifford concludes that “[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. After an overview of the James-Clifford exchange and James’ argument, I reconstruct his argument in detail. Subsequently, I examine four steps in James’ argument, and try to show that these amount to fallacies – enticing to reason, but not cogent.


Ratio ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-159
Author(s):  
Nicholas Nathan

1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira ◽  
Nicholas Wolterstorff

1991 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderick M. Chisholm

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