Distribution of Casualties in a Mass-Casualty Incident with Three Local Hospitals in the Periphery of a Densely Populated Area: Lessons Learned from the Medical Management of a Terrorist Attack

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 186-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuval H. Bloch ◽  
Dagan Schwartz ◽  
Moshe Pinkert ◽  
Amir Blumenfeld ◽  
Shkolnick Avinoam ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Medical Management ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Suicide Bombing ◽  
Populated Area ◽  
Medical Response ◽  
Ambulance Dispatch ◽  
To Receive

AbstractIntroduction:A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources.When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city.Methods:Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.Results:Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick.The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated.Conclusion:The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area.Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital.The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Managing Mild Casualties in Mass-Casualty Incidents: Lessons Learned from an Aborted Terrorist Attack

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuval H. Bloch ◽  
Adi Leiba ◽  
Nurit Veaacnin ◽  
Yohanan Paizer ◽  
Dagan Schwartz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Department ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Psychiatric Evaluation ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Minor Trauma ◽  
Medical Specialties ◽  
Medical Response ◽  
Injured Patients

AbstractIntroduction:Mildly injured and “worried well” patients can have profound effects on the management of a mass-casualty incident. The objective of this study is to describe the characteristics and lessons learned from an event that occurred on 28 August 2005 near the central bus station in Beer-Sheva, Israel. The unique profile of injuries allows for the examination of the medical and operational aspects of the management of mild casualties.Methods:Data were collected during and after the event, using patient records and formal debriefings.They were processed focusing on the characteristics of patient complaints, medical response, and the dynamics of admission.Results:A total of 64 patients presented to the local emergency department, including two critical casualties. The remaining 62 patients were mildly injured or suffered from stress. Patient presentation to the emergency department was bi-phasic; during the first two hours following the attack (i.e., early phase), the rate of arrival was high (one patient every three minutes), and anxiety was the most frequent chief complaint.During the second phase, the rate of arrival was lower (one patient every 27 minutes), and the typical chief complaint was somatic. Additionally, tinnitus and complaints related to minor trauma also were recorded frequently.Psychiatric consultation was obtained for 58 (91%) of the patients. Social services were involved in the care of 47 of the patients (73%).Otolaryngology and surgery consultations were obtained for 45% and 44%, respectively. The need for some medical specialties (e.g., surgery and orthopedics) mainly was during the first phase, whereas others, mainly psychiatry and otolaryngology, were needed during both phases. Only 13 patients (20%) needed a consultation from internal medicine.Conclusions:Following a terrorist attack, a large number of mildly injured victims and those experiencing stress are to be expected, without a direct relation to the effectiveness of the attack. Mildly injured patients tend to appear in two phases. In the first phase, the rate of admission is expected to be higher. Due to the high incidence of anxiety and other stress-related phenomena, many mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation. In the case of a bombing attack, many of the victims must be evaluated by an otolaryngologist.

Lessons Learned from Cross-border Medical Response to the Terrorist Bombings in Tabba and Ras-el-Satan, Egypt, on 07 October 2004

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 253-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Leiba ◽  
Amir Blumenfeld ◽  
Ariel Hourvitz ◽  
Gali Weiss ◽  
Michal Peres ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Time Course ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Border Zone ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Trauma Centers ◽  
Medical Response ◽  
Peripheral Areas

AbstractIntroduction:Large-scale, terrorist attacks can happen in peripheral areas, which are located close to a country's borders and far from its main medical facilities and involve multi-national casualties and responders. The objective of this study was to analyze the terrorist suicide bombings that occurred on 07 October 2004, near the Israeli-Egyptian border, as representative of such a complex scenario.Methods:Data from formal debriefings after the event were processed in order to learn about victim outcomes, resource utilization, critical events, and time course of the emergency response.Results:A total of 185 injured survivors were repatriated: four were severely wounded, 13 were moderately injured, and 168 were mildly injured. Thirty-eight people died. A forward medical team landed at the border town's airport, which provided reinforcement in the field and in the local hospital. Israeli and Egyptian search and rescue teams collaborated at the destruction site. One-hundred sixty-eight injured patients arrived at the small border hospital that rapidly organized itself for the mass-casualty incident, operating as an evacuation “staging hospital”. Twenty-three casualties secondarily were distributed to two major trauma centers in the south and the center of Israel, respectively, either by ambulance or by helicopter.Conclusion:Large-scale, terrorist attacks at a peripheral border zone can be handled by international collaboration, reinforcement of medical teams at the site itself and at the peripheral neighboring hospital, rapid rearrangement of an “evacuation hospital”, and efficient transport to trauma centers by ambulances, helicopters, and other aircraft.

scholarly journals Manchester Arena bombing: lessons learnt from a mass casualty incident

2018 ◽  
Vol 166 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross J Craigie ◽  
P J Farrelly ◽  
R Santos ◽  
S R Smith ◽  
J S Pollard ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Improvised Explosive Device ◽  
Lessons Learnt ◽  
Simulation And Training ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Improvised Explosive ◽  
London Bombings ◽  
And Training

On 22 May 2017 Salman Abedi detonated an improvised explosive device in the Manchester Arena resulting in 23 deaths (including the attacker). This was the deadliest terrorist attack on UK soil since the 2005 London bombings, but was only one of five mass casualty terrorist attacks in the UK in 2017. Preparation for mass casualty incidents (MCI) is obligatory, involving such methods as multiagency tabletop exercises, mock hospital exercises, as well as simulation and training for clinicians in managing the injuries that would be anticipated in such an event. Even in the best prepared units, such an incident will pose significant challenges due to the unpredictable nature of these events with respect to timing and number of casualties. Following an MCI, local and national reviews are undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the response, but also to identify areas where lessons can be learnt and to disseminate these to allow inclusion in future planning. We present the experience following a mass casualty terrorist incident along with a number of lessons learnt from this event.

scholarly journals Lessons from the Brussels Terrorist Attack

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (s1) ◽  
pp. s91-s92
Author(s):  
Andreas Möhler
Keyword(s):  
Disaster Response ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Damage Control ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Emergency Plan ◽  
War Injuries ◽  
Burn Care ◽  
Medical Response ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Medical Teams

Introduction:On March 22, 2016, the capital of Europe was hit by two terrorist attacks. As terrorism becomes more and more violent, it is critical to learn and share experiences in order to enhance effectiveness in saving lives.Methods:A field perspective and experience feedback from the Emergency Medical Response.Results:The first attack hit the departure hall of the airport, which, due to its strategic role, relies upon a dedicated emergency plan. However, it focuses on airplane crashes and not on explosions in a crowded terminal. The second attack hit the subway at rush hour. An attack in such a confined environment is particularly challenging for the rescue teams, as injuries are worsened, access hindered, and exits numerous.Eleven medical teams were sent in order to perform triage and provide vital care. The medical response was organized by two disaster response teams. Advanced Medical Posts were set up and the mass casualty plans of all hospitals were activated. Managing war injuries for civilian teams was challenging. On-site care consisted essentially in prehospital damage control and burn care in order to ensure rapid evacuations for haemostatic surgery. 313 victims were dispatched to thirty hospitals. Another challenge was safety. Several threats were apparent and explosives were found on both sites. Lessons from Paris had prompted a review of our multiple sites Emergency Plan. One single way of communication was used and the evacuations were managed centrally. Finally, the key factor that helped limit the number of casualties was the acquaintanceship between emergency workers and non-medical teams built during exercises, allowing them to adapt and blend in as one team.Discussion:Lessons from previous attacks were crucial to improve our management of the medical response. These should be shared around, as another attack may always occur anywhere and at any time.

Mass casualty incident after the Taba terrorist attack: an organisational and medical challenge

Disasters ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erez Karp ◽  
Gilbert Sebbag ◽  
Jochanan Peiser ◽  
Oleg Dukhno ◽  
Amnon Ovnat ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty

scholarly journals Kuala Lumpur train collision during the COVID-19 pandemic

2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alzamani M. Idrose ◽  
Fikri M. Abu-Zidan ◽  
Nurul Liana Roslan ◽  
Khairul Izwan M. Hashim ◽  
Saiyidi Mohd Azizi Mohd Adibi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Hospital Management ◽  
Standard Operating Procedure ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Base Station ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Kuala Lumpur ◽  
Disaster Plan ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Green Zone

Abstract Background Two city trains collided in an underground tunnel on 24 May 2021 at the height of COVID-19 pandemic near the Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, immediately after the evening rush hours. We aim to evaluate the management of this mass casualty incident highlighting the lessons learned to be used in preparedness for similar incidents that may occur in other major cities worldwide. Methods Information regarding incident site and hospital management response were analysed. Data on demography, triaging, injuries and hospital management of patients were collected according to a designed protocol. Challenges, difficulties and their solutions were reported. Results The train's emergency response team (ERT) has shut down train movements towards the incident site. Red zone (in the tunnel), yellow zone (the station platform) and green zone (outside the station entrance) were established. The fire and rescue team arrived and assisted the ERT in the red zone. Incident command system was established at the site. Medical base station was established at the yellow zone. Two hundred and fourteen passengers were in the trains. Sixty-four of them were injured. They had a median (range) ISS of 2 (1–43), and all were sent to Hospital Kuala Lumpur (HKL). Six (9.4%) patients were clinically triaged as red (critical), 19 (29.7%) as yellow (semi-critical) and 39 (60.9%) as green (non-critical). HKL's disaster plan was activated. All patients underwent temperature and epidemiology link assessment. Seven (10.9%) patients were admitted to the hospital (3 to the ICU, 3 to the ward and 1 to a private hospital as requested by the patient), while the rest 56 (87.5%) were discharged home. Six (9.4%) needed surgery. The COVID-19 tests were conducted on seven patients (10.9%) and were negative. There were no deaths. Conclusions The mass casualty incident was handled properly because of a clear standard operating procedure, smooth coordination between multi-agencies and the hospitals, presence of a 'binary' system for 'COVID-risk' and 'non-COVID-risk' areas, and the modifications of the existing disaster plan. Preparedness for MCIs is essential during pandemics.

Field Triage and Patient Maldistribution in a Mass-Casualty Incident

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 224-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Zoraster ◽  
Cathy Chidester ◽  
William Koenig
Keyword(s):  
Los Angeles ◽  
Prehospital Care ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Trauma Centers ◽  
Community Hospitals ◽  
Center Staff ◽  
Field Triage ◽  
Number Of Patients ◽  
To Receive

AbstractIntroduction:Management of mass-casualty incidents should optimize outcomes by appropriate prehospital care, and patient triage to the most capably facilities. The number of patients, the nature of injuries, transportation needs, distances, and hospital capabilities and availabilities are all factors to be considered. Patient maldistributions such as overwhelming individual facilities, or transport to facilities incapable of providing appropriate care should be avoided. This report is a critical view of the application of the START triage nomenclature in the prehospital arena following a train crash in Los Angeles County on 26 January 2005.Methods:A scheduled debriefing was held with the major fire and emergency medical services responders, Medical Alert Center staff, and hospitals to assess and review the response to the incident. Site visits were made to all of the hospitals involved. Follow-up questions were directed to emergency department staff that were on duty during the day of the incident.Results:The five Level-I Trauma Centers responded to the poll with the capacity to receive a total of 12 “Immediate” patients, 2.4 patients per center, the eight Level-II Trauma Centers responded with capacity to receive 17 “Immediate” patients, two patients per center, while the 25 closest community hospitals offered to accept 75 “Immediate” patients, three patients per hospital. These community hospitals were typically about one-half of the size of the trauma centers (average 287 beds versus 548, average 8.7 operating rooms versus 16.6). Twenty-six patients were transported to a community hospital >15 miles from the scene, while eight closer community hospitals did not receive any patients.Conclusions:The debriefing summary of this incident concluded that there were no consistently used criteria to decide ultimate destination for “Immediates”, and that they were distributed about equally between community hospitals and trauma centers.

Leadership as a Component of Crowd Control in a Hospital Dealing with a Mass-Casualty Incident: Lessons Learned from the October 2000 Riots in Nazareth

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 522-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moshe Pinkert ◽  
Yuval Bloch ◽  
Dagan Schwartz ◽  
Isaac Ashkenazi ◽  
Bishara Nakhleh ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Services ◽  
Hospital Management ◽  
Hospital Staff ◽  
Mass Casualty Incident ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Great Effort ◽  
Public Health Agencies ◽  
Crowd Control

AbstractIntroduction:Crowd control is essential to the handling of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs).This is the task of the police at the site of the incident. For a hospital, responsibility falls on its security forces, with the police assuming an auxiliary role. Crowd control is difficult, especially when the casualties are due to riots involving clashes between rioters and police. This study uses data regarding the October 2000 riots in Nazareth to draw lessons about the determinants of crowd control on the scene and in hospitals.Methods:Data collected from formal debriefings were processed to identify the specifics of a MCI due to massive riots. The transport of patients to the hospital and the behavior of their families were considered.The actions taken by the Hospital Manager to control crowds on the hospital premises also were analyzed.Results:During 10 days of riots (01–10 October 2000), 160 casualties, including 10 severely wounded, were evacuated to the Nazareth Italian Hospital. The Nazareth English Hospital received 132 injured patients, including one critically wounded, nine severely wounded, 26 moderately injured, and 96 mildly injured. All victims were evacuated from the scene by private vehicles and were accompanied by numerous family members. This obstructed access to hospitals and hampered the care of the casualties in the emergency department. The hospital staff was unable to perform triage at the emergency department's entrance and to assign the wounded to immediate treatment areas or waiting areas. All of the wounded were taken by their families directly into the “immediate care” location where a great effort was made to prioritize the severely injured. In order to control the events, the hospital's managers enlisted prominent individuals within the crowds to aid with control. At one point, the mayor was enlisted to successfully achieve crowd control.Conclusions:During riots, city, community, and even makeshift leaders within a crowd can play a pivotal role in helping hospital management control crowds. It may be advisable to train medical teams and hospital management to recognize potential leaders, and gain their cooperation in such an event. To optimize such cooperation, community leaders also should be acquainted with the roles of public health agencies and emergency services systems.

Medical Lessons Learned From Chernobyl Relative to Nuclear Detonations and Failed Nuclear Reactors

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 330-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cham E. Dallas
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Mass Casualty ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Clinical Procedures ◽  
Medical Response ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Administrative Strategies ◽  
A Current ◽  
Subsequent Patient

ABSTRACTThe Chernobyl disaster in 1986 involved the largest airborne release of radioactivity in history, more than 100 times as much radioactivity as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs together. The resulting emergency response, administrative blunders, and subsequent patient outcomes from this large-scale radiological disaster provide a wealth of information and valuable lessons for those who may find themselves having to deal with the staggering consequences of nuclear war. Research findings, administrative strategies (successful and otherwise), and resulting clinical procedures from the Chernobyl experience are reviewed to determine a current utility in addressing the appropriate protocols for a medical response to nuclear war. As various myths are still widely associated with radiation exposure, attention is given to the realities of a mass casualty medical response as it would occur with a nuclear detonation.(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2012;6:330-334)

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