Global libertarianism: how much public morality does international human rights law allow?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Eric Heinze

Abstract International human rights specialists and libertarian philosophers have rarely pursued meaningful exchanges, but this paper probes some of their common ground. In recent years, leading international monitoring bodies have developed a principle described here as the ‘Libertarian Principle of Human Rights’ (LPHR). It runs as follows: Governments cannot legitimately recite public morals as a sufficient justification to limit individual human rights. That principle might seem obvious in many societies today, but throughout history, including the history of liberalism, any notion that certain individual interests must trump religious or customary beliefs has stood as the rare exception. The seemingly Western and secular suggestion of a libertarian principle inherent within human rights may seem at odds with the view that human rights ought to reflect diverse cultural traditions; however, LPHR underscores an anti-authoritarianism, which, it is argued, must form part of any serious conception of human rights. LPHR can be substantiated even for highly controversial rights, such as LGBTQ+ rights, suggesting that it applies a fortiori to more settled rights.

This volume explores the principle and history of international human rights law. It addresses questions regarding the sources of human rights, its historical and cultural origins and its universality. It evaluates the effectiveness of procedures and international institutions in enforcing and ensuring compliance with human rights. This volume investigates the underlying structural principles that bind together the internationally-guaranteed rights and provide criteria for the emergence of new rights. It also evaluates whether the international human rights project has made a difference in the lives and well-being of individuals and groups around the world.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 677-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kodzo Paaku Kludze

Particularly in developing nations, the movement has been toward the articulation of elaborate provisions in constitutions which guarantee the basic human and peoples' rights of the citizenry. In many cases these are reflections of the immediate past history of the young nations which were strewn with ugly spectacles of dictatorships on their path to democracy. The history of Ghana is unfortunately an illustrative example. The Ghana Independence Constitution of 1957—a very brief document—was brief to a fault and bereft of any provision for human rights. It is clear that the experience of years of abuse of human, political, and civil rights in Ghana explains many of the current constitutional guarantees of basic rights spelt out in the 1992 Constitution in order to protect citizens against future abuses.In the past, treaty obligations under municipal laws of Ghana were such that even ratification of human rights treaties did not directly confer enforceable legal rights in the domestic courts of Ghana and implementing legislation was necessary to make a treaty right justiciable. In the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as others, are entrenched as constitutional provisions, are to be interpreted as such, and enforceable under the laws of Ghana. To the extent that drafters of the Ghana Constitution relied on the principles of the international human rights law enshrined in treaties and declarations, there are many similarities between the domestic law and some principles of international human rights law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Công Giao Vũ ◽  
Đức Nguyễn Đình

This paper tries to analize concept “alien” and “rights of aliens”, to explain the differences between “rights of citizen” and “rights of aliens”, the history of formation, development as well as content of rights of aliens in international law and Vietnam law. The authors argue that Vietnam's legislation has made strides in protecting the rights of aliens in comparision of the standards of international human rights law since Vietnamese government published the Constitution 2013, however, there are still gap between the rights of foreigners and citizens which have been not really improved in the context of globalization.


ICL Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-58
Author(s):  
Markku Suksi

Abstract It is fully legitimate and permissible under international human rights law to limit the right to vote to the citizens of the State. The relationship between sovereignty, citizenship and the right to vote is to some extent self-evident and undramatic. However, the triangular relationship between the three concepts is an important background factor summarizing much of what States are and do, and therefore, it is necessary to make visible the self-sustaining nature of the triangle and explicate the three corners of the triangle by means of drafting history of the human rights conventions and case law from international and national court instances as well as by means of examples from national law, in this case drawn from the Nordic space. The point here is that although the various human rights conventions formulate a right to participation through elections, the normative powers exercised in relation to sovereignty, citizenship and the right to vote are held by the national law-maker, and they are not influenced much by international human rights law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 267-280
Author(s):  
Kathryn McNeilly

Contingency and the counterfactual are often apprehended as tools to explore how international human rights law might have evolved differently, or have been ‘done better’ as a hopeful and emancipatory discourse. In this chapter, I remain with the theme of hope which pervades this subset of international law and undertake a counterfactual exploration of it. To do so, I ask the question ‘what if international human rights law, in its mainstream form as a discourse shaped by the United Nations, had been developed as a discourse for daydreaming?’ As rights for daydreaming, human rights would offer a vehicle to help us dream individually, but also collectively, of a future of hope which is better than the present, and to do so in a politically-engaged way. Exploring the history of international human rights law in the twentieth century, I locate one period where the futural and the political did collide, albeit not for long: in the work of states from the Global South during the 1960s–1970s. I consider the difference that might have been made had human rights successfully developed as rights for daydreaming in this period. This includes consequences for this area of law’s connection to grassroots social movements; development of its institutional processes and structures; and its compatibility with neoliberalism. Stemming from these changes, thinking international human rights otherwise in this way may have also had positive consequences for the position and potential of this international discourse today.


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