Framed Rationality: Unversality of the Subjective Expected Utility Model

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shih-Kung Lai ◽  
Li-Hung Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Expected Utility Model

Extending the argument engagement model

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam S. Richards ◽  
Ioana A. Cionea
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Probabilistic Assessment ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Negative Outcomes ◽  
Optimism Bias ◽  
Expected Values ◽  
Expected Utility Model

This investigation considers the factors that predict the intent to engage in interpersonal arguments. By adapting the argument engagement model (Hample, Paglieri, and Na 2012), a subjective expected utility model was tested to determine the effects of (1) evaluative assessments, in addition to probabilistic assessments, and (2) probabilistic assessment-trait interactions on argument engagement. Participants (N = 273) read three argument vignettes and answered questions about their intent to argue in each situation. Results were mixed regarding the significance of expected values and situation-trait interactions in predicting intentions to argue. Participants overwhelmingly reported an optimism bias, whereby they tended to perceive positive outcomes of argument as likely and negative outcomes of argument as unlikely. Possible reasons for these findings and their implications are discussed.

The Expected Utility of Insurance

2019 ◽  
pp. 8-47
Author(s):  
Brad Epperly
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Personal Security ◽  
Power Means ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
The Future ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Expected Utility Model

This chapter offers a new version of popular “insurance” models of judicial independence, in which the competitiveness of the electoral arena induces leaders to prefer more independent courts, as a means of offering policy and personal security if they lose power. That is, paying the “premium” of increased constraints on behavior imposed by independent courts now for the insurance of protection in the future if out of office. The crux of the argument is that the risks associated with losing power in autocratic regimes are greater than in democracies, and therefore competition should be more salient in dictatorships than democracies. The stakes are higher because autocratic power means access to wealth and state resources in a way rarely equaled in democratic regimes, and more importantly the likelihood of being punished after leaving office is greater for former autocrats. Judiciaries exercising greater independence, however, can minimize the risks of being a former leader, and the chapter leverages this finding to develop an expected utility model, the empirical implication of which is higher salience of competition—when present—in autocracies. Unlike previous theories of how competition affects independence, this model integrates both the likelihood of losing office and the risks associated with such an outcome, and thus allows us to examine the phenomena across the democracy/dictatorship divide.

Dynamic safety first expected utility model

2018 ◽  
Vol 271 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Choi Chiu ◽  
Hoi Ying Wong ◽  
Jing Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Expected Utility Model ◽  
Safety First
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