Effectiveness of translator certification as a signaling device: Views from the translator recruiters

Author(s):  
Andy Lung Jan Chan
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Jose J Haspa DeLarosiere ◽  
Maria DiGabriele

If audits serve as formidable internal monitoring tools which facilitate corporate governance, and Corporate Social Responsibility has been proven to serve as “an extension of corporate governance”, as well as a signaling device, are both tools not instrumental in promoting Foreign Direct Investment? Through an analysis and evaluation of the literature relating to audits and Corporate Social Responsibility, this chapter aims to investigate the above claim and question on how Corporate Social Responsibility, as “an extension of corporate governance”, as well as a signaling mechanism, could facilitate and promote Foreign Direct Investment.


2008 ◽  
Vol 123 (5) ◽  
pp. 2464
Author(s):  
Andres Etchenique
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bert D’Espallier ◽  
Marek Hudon ◽  
Ariane Szafarz

Uncertainty makes objectives harder to reach. This article examines whether uncertainty in subsidies leads to mission drift in microfinance institutions (MFIs). Using a worldwide sample of 1,151 MFIs active in 104 countries, we find that interest rates increase with aid volatility while average loan size (ALS) is inversely related to aid volatility. These results suggest that MFIs consider ALS as a signaling device for commitment to their social mission, but use interest rates as an adjustment variable to cope with uncertainty. The policy prescription to donor agencies wishing to curtail the rise in interest rates is to deliver subsidies predictably and transparently.


Refractories ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 24 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 409-410
Author(s):  
I. R. Korsakov
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 797-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iwan Bos ◽  
Wilko Letterie ◽  
Dries Vermeulen

Abstract This paper examines collusion among firms whose discount factors are private information. Mutual uncertainty regarding intentions to restrict competition might undermine the possibility of tacit collusion. Firms that want to collude may, however, reveal their intentions by consciously acting in breach of antitrust laws. As antitrust activity makes explicit collusion costly in expected terms, it can potentially be (ab)used as signaling device. We show that the fight against cartels may indeed facilitate collusion.


1987 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 1103-1103
Author(s):  
James E. Hart
Keyword(s):  

1976 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 450-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Bremser ◽  
Robert S. Davidson ◽  
Robert M. Mortensen

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