scholarly journals Overpopulation and Procreative Liberty

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Bognar
Keyword(s):  
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-195
Author(s):  
John A. Robertson

The role of stigma in limiting reproductive rights has long hovered in the air. Paula Abrams has sorted through the concept and shown how it operates in two major areas of procreative liberty — having a child through surrogacy and avoiding childbirth by abortion. Her paper is especially useful for showing how legal change initially dilutes stigma but may reinstall it with post-legalization regulation.Abrams argues that both abortion and surrogacy are stigmatized because they deviate from traditional gender roles and social expectations about pregnancy and maternity. Past restrictions have rested on a common legal and cultural paradigm of the good mother: a woman who conceives, carries her child to term, and then rears the child. Indeed, as she later argues, evidence of stigma surrounding a practice is “relevant to determining whether laws regulating abortion or surrogacy are based on impermissible stereotyping.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 18-20
Author(s):  
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 13 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 179-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Robertson
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín

Proponents of reprogenetics usually use a right-based liberal approach as the framework to assess and defend these technologies. They claim that reproductive choice is a basic freedom and that interfering with individuals’ autonomous reproductive choices is legitimate only when such choices clearly and seriously harm others. This chapter shows that, although appeals to procreative freedom are persuasive regarding some aspects of reproduction, they fail to settle important questions about the permissibility of reprogenetics. It calls attention to the lack of agreement on the existence and nature of reproductive liberty. It then shows that even if one agreed that reproductive liberty entails the right to procreate, further argument is needed to show that such a right also involves a right to have a particular child. It also shows that proponents’ contention that no relevant harms can be proven to result from the use of reprogenetics is unpersuasive.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 440-446
Author(s):  
SALLY DALTON-BROWN

Abstract:This article considers recent ethical topics in Australia relating to the health rights of children in the contexts of (1) detention centers, (2) vaccination, and (3) procreative liberty, within a wider framework of discussion of the competing rights of society, parents, the child, and future generations.


1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 189-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Robertson

Roe v. Wade is a landmark case for women and for reproductive rights. By permitting abortion, Roe v. Wade gives women some control over the timing of pregnancy and childrearing, and has reinforced the movement of women into the labor force. Nevertheless, it is a hotly contested decision. The most fervent critics decry its substantive position on fetal status, likening it to Dred Scott and Nazi atrocities. Others classify it as an arbitrary infliction of judicial will unfit to be called law.Roe v. Wade, however, is not as radical a departure from the main currents of constitutional precedent as charged. Its premises about procreative choice stem from the Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird? Its evaluation of fetal status is not markedly different from common law positions. Nor has Roe v. Wade's recognition of procreative liberty greatly expanded the list of nonprocreative rights, as many persons had hoped or feared.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document