Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Clustered Scale-Free Networks under Different Initial Distributions

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 080202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Chuang ◽  
Jia Jian-Yuan ◽  
Chen Xiao-Jie ◽  
Cong Rui ◽  
Wang Long
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Scale Free Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Initial Distributions

scholarly journals COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME IN RANDOM SCALE-FREE GRAPHS

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 849-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
JULIA PONCELA ◽  
JESÚS GÓMEZ-GARDEÑES ◽  
YAMIR MORENO ◽  
LUIS MARIO FLORÍA
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mean Field Approximation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Scale Free Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Random Scale

In this paper we study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in random scale-free networks. We show that the survival of cooperation is enhanced with respect to random homogeneous graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when compared to that found in Barabási–Albert scale-free networks. We show that the latter decrease is related to the structure of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean field approximation for studying evolutionary dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and with arbitrary degree distribution. The mean field approach is similar to the one used for describing the disease spreading in complex networks, making a further compartmentalization of the strategists partition into degree-classes. We show that this kind of approximation is suitable to describe the behavior of the system for a particular set of initial conditions, such as the placement of cooperators in the higher-degree classes, while it fails to reproduce the level of cooperation observed in the numerical simulations for arbitrary initial configurations.

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