Null results for the steal-framing effect on out-group aggression

Whether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

The Effect of Perceived Uncertainty on Competitive Behavior

How do people behave in the face of uncertainty? Some studies suggest that even when they are unaware of how others will behave, people default to cooperative behavior; however, other research suggests that uncertainty leads to more competitive behavior. Little research has examined how individual differences moderate such behavioral decisions. This study proposes that a stable (dispositional) sense of justice may, ironically, lead to more competitive behavior. Specifically, people who score highly in belief in a just world, system justification, and religiosity, and low in ambiguity tolerance may be more inclined to compete rather than cooperate because they believe people who experience positive outcomes deserve those outcomes regardless of the means taken to achieve them. Across two studies, participants (N = 288) engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma game — a task where they must choose to compete or cooperate — and completed the aforementioned individual difference measures. Results show that people tended to cooperate, but those high in system justification and belief in a just world were more likely to compete. In other words, people with a strong sense of cosmic justice were likely to exhibit competitive behavior under uncertain conditions. KEYWORDS: Ambiguity Tolerance; Competition; Cooperation; Just World Beliefs; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Prosocial Behavior; Religiosity; System Justification; Uncertainty

Two Dogmas of Research Ethics

This chapter reviews a series of arguments that purport to show that there is an inherent moral dilemma in research with humans and that this conflict produces a corresponding social dilemma, known as the prisoner’s dilemma. If these arguments are sound, it would show that dual requirements of the egalitarian research imperative outlined in chapter 4 cannot be satisfied in practice. This chapter argues that these arguments fail and that their intuitive force in this area is bolstered by two dogmas of research ethics: the claim that the ethical norms in this area derive from the role-related obligations of medical professionals and the claim that research is an inherently utilitarian undertaking. This chapter demonstrates that rejecting those dogmas creates a space for reconciling the production of socially valuable information with respect for research participants as free and equal.

How Does Misperception Affect Zero-Determinant Strategies In Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma?

Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have attracted wide attention in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games, since the player equipped with ZD strategies can unilaterally enforce the two players’ expected utilities subjected to a linear relation. On the other hand, uncertainties, which may be caused by misperception, occur in IPD inevitably in practical circumstances. To better understand the situation, we consider the influence of misperception on ZD strategies in IPD, where the two players, player X and player Y , have different cognitions, but player X detects the misperception and it is believed to make ZD strategies by player Y. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the ZD strategies in IPD with misperception, where there is also a linear relationship between players’ utilities in player X’s cognition. Then we explore bounds of players’ expected utility deviation from a linear relationship in player X’s cognition with also improving its own utility.