scholarly journals On Cournot-Nash equilibria in generalized qualitative games with an atomless measure space of agents

1987 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ali Khan ◽  
Nikolaos S. Papageorgiou
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Anderson ◽  
Haosui Duanmu ◽  
M. Ali Khan ◽  
Metin Uyanik

AbstractThis paper provides four theorems on the existence of a free-disposal equilibrium in a Walrasian economy: the first with an arbitrary set of agents with compact consumption sets, the next highlighting the trade-offs involved in the relaxation of the compactness assumption, and the last two with a countable set of agents endowed with a weighting structure. The results generalize theorems in the antecedent literature pioneered by Shafer–Sonnenschein in 1975, and currently in the form taken in He–Yannelis 2016. The paper also provides counterexamples to the existence of non-free-disposal equilibrium in cases of both a countable set of agents and an atomless measure space of agents. One of the examples is related to one Chiaki Hara presented in 2005. The examples are of interest because they satisfy all the hypotheses of Shafer’s 1976 result on the existence of a non-free-disposal equilibrium, except for the assumption of a finite set of agents. The work builds on recent work of the authors on abstract economies, and contributes to the ongoing discussion on the modelling of “large” societies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Patriche

We define the model of an abstract economy with differential (asymmetric) information and a measure space of agents. We generalize N. C. Yannelis's result (2007), considering that each agent is characterised by a random preference correspondence instead of having a random utility function. We establish two different equilibrium existence results.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


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