scholarly journals A strengthening of the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism

Analysis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan E Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Consequence Argument

A Lost Lesson in Keith Lehrer’s Reply to the Consequence Argument

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-558
Author(s):  
Michael McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Positive Account

Abstract In this article, the author examines Keith Lehrer’s response to the Consequence Argument. He argues that his response has advantages over David Lewis’s. Contrary to what Lewis suggests in a footnote, Lehrer’s assessment of an ability to affect the laws of nature in deterministic settings is largely the same as Lewis’s. However, Lehrer’s position has an advantage that Lewis’s lacks. Lehrer integrates his proposal within a positive account of freedom, and this helps to explain how it could be that an agent is able to do otherwise in deterministic settings in such a way that if she did, some law of nature would be different.

Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument

Free Will ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 47-77
Author(s):  
Helen Beebee
Keyword(s):  
Consequence Argument

Abilities and Incompatibilism

2021 ◽  
pp. 32-53
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle
Keyword(s):  
Consequence Argument

This chapter begins the task of relating a contextualist account of agential modals to questions concerning freedom. In the first two sections, different ways of characterizing abilities and their relationship to freedom are discussed. This helps clarify the framework and assumptions that the subsequent arguments rely upon. Next, an influential argument for incompatibilism, namely the consequence argument, is argued to be problematic. Using the notion of an all-in ability, the question of how best to develop the case for incompatibilism is then considered. After criticizing an argument for incompatibilism based upon all-in abilities, the chapter ends by offering a reformulation of the consequence argument, in light of the characterization of all-in abilities.

Free Will and the Burden of Proof

2019 ◽  
pp. 48-63
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Philosophical Assumption ◽  
Set Up

Moore’s method is deployed in favor of the compatibility of free will with causal determinism. It is pointed out that the compatibilism issue has always been set up prejudicially: the compatibilist has been required to offer an analysis of “free action” that both is correct and exhibits the compatibility with determinism. This chapter argues that according to sound dialectical procedure, but contrary to tradition, the incompatibilist bears the burden of proof, and that an incompatibilist argument will contain a bare philosophical assumption that should be rejected on Moorean grounds. (Moreover, a compatibilist not only need not but should not attempt an analysis of “free action.”) All this is illustrated by a close examination of the impressive “Consequence argument” for incompatibilism.

What the Consequence Argument Is an Argument For

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-56
Author(s):  
Justin A. Capes
Keyword(s):  
Consequence Argument

scholarly journals Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation of the Consequence Argument

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 426-433
Author(s):  
Johan E Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Inference Rule ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Standard Version ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Invalid Inference

Abstract Daniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have shown that the argument is based on a failure to understand Logic 101. Given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something, they claim that the argument relies on an invalid inference rule. In this paper, I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument. Therefore, Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation fails.

scholarly journals Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument

Manuscrito ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Merlussi
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Consequence Argument
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