Prospects for Moral Success Theory

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them. In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality. My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

Prospects for Moral Success Theory

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them. In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality. My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

“And He Ate Jim Crow”

Why do racist oppression and capitalist exploitation often seem so inescapable and intractable? To describe and explain adequately the persistence of racist ideology, to specify its role in the maintenance of racial capitalism, and to imagine the conditions of its abolition, we must understand racist ideology as a form of false consciousness. False consciousness gets things “right” at the level of appearance, but it mistakes that appearance for a “deep” or essential truth. This chapter articulates a novel, positive account of first-order false consciousness, which occurs in the case of false beliefs about the world that are sustained and superficially justified by objective social arrangements, and of second-order false consciousness, which occurs in the case of false beliefs about how one has come to hold the beliefs that one does. To dismantle racist ideology requires political movements that craft theoretical interventions highlighting the inessentiality and contingency of despised racial groups’ oppressed status, as well as practical interventions aimed at directly undermining the oppressive conditions that are reflected in racist beliefs about the “naturalness” or “appropriateness” of these groups’ degraded status.

The Wilds, Untamed, and Spontaneity

Chapter 4 discusses a “positive” account of madness. The Zhuangist, among others, focuses on the way we can understand an inherent value in madness depending on how we conceive of situations in given perspectives, and that we have reason to resist understanding particular people as mad or disordered objectively. The idea here is to include any mental state that is regularly seen as problematic or getting in the way of efficient or proper human functioning. This chapter also discusses a host of mad or mentally disordered individuals found in early Chinese texts, with the aim of understanding how they fit into the structure built thus far, and how various appearances of these characters (such as the “Madman of Chu”) in different texts will often serve to illustrate the divergent messages about mental disorder we find in these texts.

Introduction

Crispin Wright’s work on vagueness has been extremely influential. This piece provides an overview of his contributions and the ways his views have changed over the forty-plus years he has been writing about the topic. Heck argues that Wright’s discussion of the Tachometer paradox provides us with the resources to disarm the Sorites paradox. Sadly, that still leaves us remarkably far from any positive account of the semantics of vague concepts. In his most recent work, Wright has pursued an ‘intuitionistic’ account of vagueness whose virtues and vices are described.

The War in Epirus

Constantine, whose main concern was Bulgaria, was persuaded to move to Epirus where Greek-Turkish hostilities continued. He was accompanied by his staff including Metaxas, who developed staff plans for the assault on Bizani; and by royal princes and nurses. His task was to reinvigorate the Greek army in Epirus which was bogged down in the siege of Bizani outside Janina. Venizelos visited him there, and received a positive account of the prospects from the staff. The two men had a near escape in a shelling incident. The fall of Bizani followed, as planned by Metaxas, and Janina was occupied, another success for Greek arms, opening up a route to Northern Epirus/Albania.

The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are four main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is (i) metaphysically independent; or (ii) belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii) perfectly natural; or (iv) metaphysically primitive. Here, I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii)–(iv) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, my conclusion is that the dispositional essentialist should seek an alternative. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options.

Cooperation in a Larger World

This chapter has three aims. First: it presents a positive account of the origins of multi-level society in human social life, for even the simplest forager bands are nested units in larger communities, and those bands are open, with quite free movement in and out, and with individuals having social allies in other bands. This makes possible cooperation in various guises at larger social and spatial scales. Great ape bands, and hence very likely early hominin bands, were closed, with an individual’s residential group being his/her whole social world. Second, it introduces the reader to group selection models of the evolution of human cooperation. Third, it argues against the view that human social life in the Pleistocene was structured by regular intergroup conflict and by its permanent threat.

The History and Growth of Judicial Review, Volume 2

This second volume builds on the story of Volume I as to the origins and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and the European Union. In addition to discussing the judicial review systems of the major civil law countries in this Volume, I also discuss the birth and growth in power of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights, both of which hear cases ffrom common law as well as civil law countries. This Volume considers the four major theories that help to explain the origins of judicial review, which I discussed as to common law countries. Volume II identifies which theories of the origination and growth in power of judicial review apply best in the various countries discussed. Volume II considers not only what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what leads to the growth of judicial power over time. My positive account of what causes the birth and growth of judicial review in so many very different countries over such a long period of time may have normative implications for those constitution writers who want a strong form of judicial review to come into being.

The History and Growth of Judicial Review, Volume 1

These two books examine the history and growth of judicial review in the key G-20 constitutional democracies, which include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and the European Union. Both books look at four different theories, which help to explain the birth of judicial review, and to identify which theories apply best in the various countries discussed. The two books consider not only what gives rise to judicial review originally, but also what causes of judicial review lead it to grow and become more powerful and prominent over time. The positive account of what causes the origins and growth of judicial review in so many very different countries, over such a long period of time, has normative implications for the future of judicial review, of the G-20 nations, and of the European Union. This is first sustained positive account of the origins and growth of judicial review in the G-20 constitutional democracies, and in a few other regimes as well. Volume I discusses the G-20 Nations that are Common Law democracies, as well as Israel, and Volume II discusses the G-20 Nations that are Civil Law democracies, as well as the mixed civil law/common law power of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights.