TRANSPARENCY AND COORDINATED EFFECTS IN EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 839-851
Author(s):  
S. Albaek ◽  
P. Mollgaard ◽  
P. B. Overgaard
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gisela Aigner ◽  
Oliver Budzinski ◽  
Arndt Christiansen

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Maier-Rigaud ◽  
Ulrich Schwalbe ◽  
Felix Forster

AbstractThis article focusses on the non-coordinated effects of minority shareholdings in oligopolistic markets. It is demonstrated that minority shareholdings even when they fall below the usual thresholds can lead to a significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) on a purely non-coordinated basis. This is particularly likely in a market with differentiated products, when a firm partially acquires shareholdings in its closest competitor and when the next best alternative products are only weak substitutes.


2002 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Kravtseniouk

This paper shows the principal features of merger control in selected transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), namely Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, by applying case study methodology. The presented findings are based on the analysis of Hungarian, Romanian and Slovenian competition law and merger rulings reached by the Competition Offices of these countries. A substantial part of the conclusions is drawn from a sample of 42 merger applications processed by the Office of Economic Competition of Hungary between 1994 and 2000. The results of empirical analysis demonstrate the considerable flexibility of merger control in the studied countries, its orientation towards the future of domestic markets and a close link with industrial policy. The paper also highlights the areas of interdependence of competition policy and transition and argues that merger control in the studied CEE countries may be regarded as currently adequate to the requirements imposed by transition.


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