The Evolution and Takeoff of the Ecuadorian Economic Groups

An economic group is a collection of parent and subsidiary corporations that operates as a single economic organism under the same legislature of control. The decisions taken by the economic groups in any country are among the most influential factors that impact its market and the country’s economic political scenario. This work studies the impact of the Ecuadorian economic groups from 2015 to 2019, where a historical peak of 300 economic groups was reached. However, the taxes representativeness of the Ecuadorian economic groups remained stable during the same period of analysis. We analyzed the financial and fiscal variables of the Ecuadorian ranking of firms, and detected the following of its economic groups: (i) They are still concentrating wealth despite the implementation of hard government policies to transparent the financial and economic information; (ii) They tend to compete in oligopolistic markets, given that their economic and financial decisions are interconnected with their family firms or consortium groups; (iii) They operate in a behavioral nature that follows a linear association between the total income, total assets, total equity, and total tax collection. We hope this work will serve as a future reference for researchers focused on the economic groups of Ecuador and Latin American countries.

The Online Market’s Invisible Hand: Internet Media and Rising Populism

Given the recent surge of global populism, this article explores the relationship between Internet/social media and support for populist parties by focusing on the structure of the online marketplace. We argue that structure shapes digital networks’ incentives in terms of the content they favor, and marketing strategies they employ to distribute content on a mass scale. Specifically, concentrated/oligopolistic markets mean powerful digital entities that can leverage the regulatory process—thereby weakening constraints and incentivizing consumption/profit above all else. Consequently, these entities can freely favor more incendiary/attention-generating content, and use their outsized influence to saturate the online marketplace with targeted advertising—all of which can amplify the diffusion of populist rhetoric and intensify support bases. Using original data on Internet ownership concentration, social media user-traffic, and populist party vote share in 34 democracies, our findings suggest that concentration of Internet ownership and online audiences each contribute to rising support for populism.

Competing and cooperating globally: how firms’ multimarket contact relates to joint price elevation in coopetition networks

Purpose This study aims to draw attention to the familiarity effect among international multimarket contact (MMC) firms on coopetition in the global container shipping industry and to better understand the contingency model of structural holes and in-degree centrality on joint price elevation actions and subsequent performance. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on competitive dynamics and the literature on networks, a panel data model is developed from 6,489 competitive and 7,146 cooperative actions of the top 21 shipping firms in 18 global arenas with a structured content analysis method being applied. Findings Stronger MMC by firms requires increased levels of cooperative actions to elevate prices. This coopetition relationship is enhanced or weakened when the focal firm occupies a higher level of structural hole or position of competitive in-degree centrality. Practical implications Shipping liners seeking to cooperate with joint action in oligopolistic markets are offered guidelines and strategies to increase their performance through their actions. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on coopetition networks by further analyzing interfirm relationships and interactions that enhance performance, while exploring network positioning strategies to mitigate risks.

Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern — that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention — that competition benefits consumers — is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.