Implications of the Digital Economy on Merger Control in Pakistan and China: Policy Implications for Pakistan

The rise of the digital economy has challenged the foundation of competition law frameworks the world over. Today, the antitrust doctrine finds itself confronting a new economy; an econo-my wherein data acts as a currency, markets are without prices, market collisions are based on algorithms, and the market is ‘infinite’. Several jurisdictions such as Germany, Austria, and China have developed new regulations or amended existing legislations to confront the chal-lenges presented by the digital economy. A dearth of theoretical and empirical literature has evaluated whether digital markets are so fundamentally different as to require a different set of rules. Of specific interest to this paper is whether current competition rules are sufficient to deal with mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in digital markets. This paper assesses M&A regulations in China and Pakistan in light of the new digital economy. Expert interviews were conducted using semi-structured interviews to investigate the comparisons between Pakistan’s and China’s merger control regimes. The findings indicate that China’s merger control regulations are better adopted for the digital economy than Pakistani’s. It also sets out the policy implications for competition policy makers in Pakistan.

Russian merger control: in favor of foreign companies?

PurposeThe paper aims to reveal the attitude of the Russian competition authorities towards cross-border mergers involving foreign buyers. The study addresses the following question: Is the probability of Russian competition authorities' intervention significantly different when a foreign buyer takes part in the merger? This is the key test to reveal whether competition authorities gravitate towards “economic nationalism” or “promotion of foreign investments”.Design/methodology/approachThe discrete choice model is applied to the dataset of 7,607 merger cases investigated by the Russian competition authorities between 2012 and 2017. The probability of competition authorities' intervention, such as merger correction by using remedies or deal rejection, is used as a measure of special attention.FindingsThe study finds out favoritism patterns of the regulator with regard to foreign companies. In particular, the deals involving a foreign buyer had less chance of intervention, i.e. imposition of remedies, from national competition authorities. The sanctions period does not moderate the probability of approval of a cross-border merger with foreign buyers by the Russian competition authorities.Originality/valueThe paper contributes to merger control literature by addressing the political economy issues. It discovers that, besides regulation by the law, there are hidden motives, such as protectionism or favoritism of foreign companies, which could drive the regulator's decision. Therefore, the studies of cross-border mergers provide an opportunity to investigate the political issues of merger control through the identification of a special attitude to foreign companies and analysis of regularities that might explain such a policy.

20. Mergers (1): introduction

This chapter briefly discusses the subject of merger control. Merger control is an important component of most, though not all, systems of competition law. Merger control has been under particular scrutiny in recent years, partly as a result of the rapid development of digital technologies and the emergence of powerful digital platforms. Separately there has been a certain backlash against the trend towards the globalisation of markets, and national governments, as well as the EU, have considered whether controls over the foreign acquisition of key industries are required, and whether the basic test of merger control – would a merger be harmful to competition? – should be supplemented by broader provisions enabling ‘the public interest’ to be taken into account. Against this background, the chapter begins by explaining what is meant by a ‘merger’ or ‘concentration’, the term used by the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). It then proceeds to describe the different effects of mergers between independent firms from within and different production levels, the proliferation of systems of merger control, why firms merge, and the purpose of merger control. The final section of the chapter deals with how to design a system of merger control when a country decides, as a matter of policy, to adopt one.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

22. Mergers (3): UK

This chapter discusses UK law on the control of mergers. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the domestic system of merger control. Section 3 explains the procedure of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) when determining whether a merger should be referred for an in-depth ‘Phase 2’ investigation and when deciding to accept ‘undertakings in lieu’ of a reference. Section 4 describes how Phase 2 investigations are conducted and Section 5 discusses the ‘substantially lessening competition’ (‘SLC’) test. Section 6 explains the enforcement powers in the Enterprise Act 2002, including the remedies that the CMA can impose in merger cases. The subsequent sections discuss various supplementary matters, such as powers of investigation and enforcement. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the merger control provisions work in practice and a brief account of the provisions on public interest cases, other special cases and mergers in the water industry. The withdrawal by the UK from the EU means that many mergers that were subject to a ‘one-stop shop’ under EU law are now subject to investigation in the UK as well.

Reconciling the "Bittersweet Chemistry" between Technology and Corporate Takeovers through Reinforcing National Security Interests in Merger Control

This article argues that company takeover regulation regimes must carefully balance two opposing notions. On the one hand, the regime must be designed to enable or facilitate the initiation and successful implementation of takeovers and mergers in the interests of economic growth and technological advancement. On the other hand, such a regulatory framework ought to be sensitive to the ever-increasing need to protect national security interests, especially from veiled threats. These threats include cybercrimes, private data hacking and espionage, which are endemic to takeovers contemplated by foreign persons that possess technological sophistication and are leaders in the rapidly unfolding Fourth Industrial Revolution. Recently some jurisdictions, such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom, have been active in reforming their investment laws to particularly strengthen the protection of national security interests. Similarly, in South Africa the debut introduction of section 18A of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018 has enabled the addition of a concurrent but parallel standard to the pre-existing merger control criteria prescribed under section 12A of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. This article evaluates the efficacy of South Africa's framework for national security interests' protection in the context of merger control using its US and UK counterparts as comparators. Ultimately, the article proposes reforming the existing statutory and institutional framework to effectively accommodate national security interests in South African merger control.