8 The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restraints

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Early Case ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Independent Distribution

This chapter examines independent distribution and how it is treated under EU competition law. Since the 1960s, it is acknowledged that vertical agreements can entail restrictions of competition—generally called ‘vertical restraints’—which deserve competition law scrutiny. While the early case law and Regulations adopted in the field focused primarily on restrictions of intra-brand competition, a more liberal and economic approach was introduced with the promulgation of Regulation 2790/1999. The new legal framework rested on a basic economic premise: the ability of a vertical agreement to produce anticompetitive effects hinges predominantly on the market power of the parties to the agreement. With the expiry of Regulation 2790/1999 on 31 May 2010, but also with the growth of large retailers throughout Europe and the rise of internet distribution, the Commission initiated a review process in July 2009 which culminated in the adoption of Regulation 330/2010 and of a new set of Guidelines.

5. The legal framework

2021 ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Restraint Of Trade ◽  
The Eu

‘The legal framework’ outlines the key competition provisions currently in the US and EU. Like in most other jurisdictions, EU and US laws include competition provisions that are used to address antitrust violations such as anti-competitive agreements or abuse of monopoly power. They also include laws dealing with proposed mergers and acquisitions. The US Antitrust Law prohibits contracts and agreements between two or more individuals or entities in restraint of trade or commerce. Meanwhile, EU competition law prohibits agreements between ‘undertakings’ that have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, and affect trade between the EU member states.

EU Competition Law and Economics

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Law And Economics ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Integrated Approach ◽  
Integrated Treatment ◽  
European Court ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Economic Reasoning ◽  
Economic Foundations

This EU competition law treatise fully integrates economic reasoning in its treatment of the decisional practice of the European Commission and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. Since the European Commission's move to a “more economic approach” to competition law reasoning and decisional practice, the use of economic argument in competition law cases has become a stricter requirement. Many national competition authorities are also increasingly moving away from a legalistic analysis of a firm's conduct to an effect-based analysis of such conduct, indeed most competition cases today involve teams composed of lawyers and industrial organisation economists. Ensuring an integrated approach to legal and economic analysis, the book contains economic reasoning throughout in accessible form, and, more pertinently for practitioners, examines economics in the light of how it is used and put to effect in the courts and decision-making institutions of the EU. A general introductory section sets EU competition law in its historical context. The second chapter goes on to explore the economic foundations of EU competition law. What follows is an integrated treatment of each of the core substantive areas of EU competition law, including Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, mergers, cartels and other horizontal agreements, vertical restraints, and technology transfer agreements.

The European Court of Justice and the More Economic Approach to EU Competition Law—Is the Tide Turning?

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Witt
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
More Economic Approach

In the late 1990s, the European Commission embarked on a mission to bring EU competition policy more into line with contemporary economic theory. Over a period of ten years, it systematically revised key legal concepts of all three pillars of EU competition law. Most importantly, it adopted the consumer welfare aim, revised its understanding of competitive harm and countervailing effects accordingly, and committed itself to carrying out more in-depth assessments of the investigated conduct’s effects instead of relying on form-based presumptions of illegality. Initially, many tenets of the more economic approach were in conflict with the case law of the European Court of Justice, which had a broader understanding of the aims of EU competition law. However, after a few initial set-backs for the Commission, several recent judgments in cases such as MEO, Intel, Post Danmark I, and Cartes Bancaires suggest that the Court’s understanding of EU competition law is evolving and that it is willing to embrace at least a few of the Commission’s revised principles. In particular, it is adopting a more effects-based approach to assessing business conduct and is cautiously curbing its former concept of harm in exclusionary situations. At the same time, however, it continues to adhere to many of its former freedom- and fairness-based principles, so that a number of uncertainties and inconsistencies remain.

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