O DIREITO ANTITRUSTE BRASILEIRO E A REPRESSÃO À CONCORRÊNCIA ILÍCITA: FORMAÇÃO DE CARTÉIS E ACORDOS NA LEI 12.529/2011

The scope of this article is to study Competition Law and establish its conception in and for contemporaneity, based on which the Brazilian System for the Defense of Competition will be analyzed. Given its analytical and critical conception, the work is carried out according to the deductive method, without forgetting the use of the hermeneutic-dialectic approach. After analyzing some instruments considered adequate to repress cartelization, the study clarifies the nuances that permeate it from the perspective of the Competition Defense Law. Understood, in contemporary times, as an instrument for the implementation of public policies aimed at safeguarding free competition, the repression of the abuse of economic power and the pursuit of anti-competitive offenses, the Brazilian Antitrust Law structured a system of dual protection of competition - control of structures and conduct - and, by authorizing CADE to enter into agreements with infringing economic agents, it ensured the use of effective instruments for proving illegal practices, repression- punishment and prevention, especially with regard to cartels.

The Causes and Consequences of the Neo-Brandeisian Antitrust Movement in the United States

The recent appointments of Timothy Wu as Special Assistant to the U.S. President for Technology and Competition Policy and Lina Khan, a member of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, two prominent advocates for a fundamental shift in U.S. antitrust policy, and the introduction of federal and state legislation to change how antitrust is applied signal a realistic possibility of a fundamental change of direction in the course of U.S. antitrust. The shift advocated by these self-described “Brandeisians” goes beyond the reform proposals advocated by the Post-Chicago School movement. Whereas the Post-Chicago School movement, which was based primarily on industrial organization theory, advocated for change while recognizing the primacy of economic theory in the application of antitrust law, the Neo-Brandeisians argue that economic considerations should only be part of the substantive antitrust analysis and not necessarily the determinative factor. For many Europeans, and in particular Germans familiar with legal history, the ideas advanced by the Neo-Brandeisians will be familiar. Louis Brandeis, whose writings and opinions serve as the intellectual compass of the Neo-Brandeisians, was himself influenced by the Freirechtsbewegung and their skepticism of a wertfreie jurisprudence. Borrowing from post-modernist philosophy, the Neo-Brandeisians recognize that the dominant legal doctrines reflect the prevailing power structures in society. In their view, the fact that U.S. antitrust law relies heavily on economic theory does not allow it to claim value neutrality. The more radical members of this movement consequently argue that other values beyond economics should be considered in the application of U.S. antitrust law by the courts and antitrust agencies. In this article we attempt to introduce this movement to a European audience and assess its possible impact on the direction of U.S. antitrust.

Use of economic research in cases of violations of antitrust law by digital platforms

The article is devoted to the influence of the economic features of the digital platform market on the application of competition law. Purpose – to identify the features of economic research, including economic expertise, in cases of violation of antimonopoly legislation by the owners of digital platforms. Thus, the economic features of the digital platform market and the use of economic research and expertise in cases of violations of competition law by digital platforms are investigated. Results. The types of economic research conducted in cases of violations of antimonopoly legislation by the owners of digital platforms and the features of economic research, including economic examinations, carried out in such cases, are highlighted. These features are determined, first of all, by the specifics of the platform economy and they consist in the use of special methods for qualifying economic phenomena.

Monopoly and corporate innovation: evidence from antitrust law

Purpose There are two opposite views about whether the Antitrust Law is conducive to the development of the economy. One view is that the Antitrust Law can restrain monopoly, maintain market competition and benefit economic growth. The other view is that the Antitrust Law inhibits innovation by monopolistic firms and fosters rent-seeking, which is bad for economic growth. To provide a possible perspective for clarifying the controversy, this paper aims to answer the following two questions: first, will the Antitrust Law inhibit corporate innovation? Second, does the antitrust enforcement agency discriminate against private enterprises? Design/methodology/approach Based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013, the authors use the implementation of China’s Antitrust Law in 2008 as a policy shock, take the monopoly enterprises in each industry as the treatment group and competitive enterprises as the control group, using the difference-in-differences method to test the impact of the implementation of the Antitrust Law on corporate innovation activities. Findings The results show that compared with competitive enterprises, the patent output of monopolistic enterprises was significantly reduced after the implementation of the Antitrust Law, which indicates that the Antitrust Law does inhibit the innovation activities of monopolistic enterprises. Further research finds that the innovation suppression effect of the Antitrust Law is more prominent in state-owned enterprises, which means that the government does not have “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises in the process of law enforcement. Therefore, the results provide evidence for the idea that government intervention is neutral. Originality/value First, the paper enriches and expands the research on the factors affecting corporate innovation from the perspective of market structure. Second, it enriches and expands relevant research on the consequences of implementing the Antitrust Law from the perspective of corporate innovation. Third, it not only provides the relevant empirical evidence for clarifying the dispute about the Antitrust Law but also is helpful to clarify whether the Chinese Government has “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises.

The antitrust immunity of intellectual property in Russia

The growing importance of intellectual property as an asset raises the question whether exercising of the intellectual property rights shall be regulated by antitrust law to protect against possible abuses and ensure the efficiency of the economy. The study aims to improve the existing regulation in the Russian Federation and align it with the idea of balancing private and public interests while fostering competition and encouraging innovation.

Introduction

Antitrust law has very rarely been used by workers to challenge anticompetitive employment practices. Yet recent empirical research shows that labor markets are highly concentrated and that employers engage in practices that harm competition and suppress wages. These practices include no-poaching agreements, wage-fixing, mergers, covenants not to compete, and misclassification of gig workers as independent contractors. This failure of antitrust is due to a range of other failures—intellectual, political, moral, and economic. Until recently, economists assumed that labor markets are usually competitive when in fact recent studies reveal that they are usually not competitive. Commentators and politicians also seems to have assumed—falsely—that employment and labor law adequately addresses inequality of bargaining power and the resulting risk of wage suppression. The impact of this failure has been profound for wage levels, economic growth, and inequality.

Employment and Labor Law

Antitrust law cannot directly address wage suppression that occurs as a result of search costs and job differentiation, which cause frictions in labor markets. The question arises whether other employment and labor regulations can be used to reduce the monopsony power of employers that arises from these sources, or to mitigate its ill effects. These regulations include minimum wage law, tax and wage subsidies, mandatory benefits, job protection, licensing, training, job standardization, labor law, governance reforms, and macroeconomic reform. While some of these regulations, if well-designed, can help mitigate the harms of labor monopsony, many of them are ill-suited to this task.