Further Versions of the Reduction Argument
Keyword(s):
This chapter gives a second and third version of the reduction argument against non-reductive realism. It notes that the second version of the argument does not appeal to (S) or to any other claim about supervenience. It argues that the reduction argument also applies to normative relations, such as the relation of being a reason for and the relation of resultance. It argues that the reduction argument does not support rampant reductionism. And it offers three explanations of why non-reductive realists often remain unmoved by the argument. The chapter concludes that if there are normative properties, these properties are identical to descriptive properties.
2017 ◽
2017 ◽
2018 ◽
Vol 8
(4)
◽
pp. 300-321
2017 ◽
Keyword(s):