The Reduction Argument

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Property Identity ◽  
Reductive Realism

This chapter gives a first version of the reduction argument against non-reductive realism. It explains the criterion of property identity that this argument appeals to, and argues that this criterion is correct. The chapter then argues that non-reductive realists cannot resist the reduction argument by appealing to Leibniz’s law, by claiming that irreducibly normative properties are indispensable to deliberation, or by rejecting the claim about supervenience that the argument appeals to. The chapter ends by discussing several objections to the descriptive predicate that this version of the reduction argument makes use of. It concludes that these objections fail to undermine the argument.

Further Versions of the Reduction Argument

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Reductive Realism

This chapter gives a second and third version of the reduction argument against non-reductive realism. It notes that the second version of the argument does not appeal to (S) or to any other claim about supervenience. It argues that the reduction argument also applies to normative relations, such as the relation of being a reason for and the relation of resultance. It argues that the reduction argument does not support rampant reductionism. And it offers three explanations of why non-reductive realists often remain unmoved by the argument. The chapter concludes that if there are normative properties, these properties are identical to descriptive properties.

‘Appearing Equal’ at Phaedo 74 B 4 – C 6: an Epistemic Interpretation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Tuozzo
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Colour Perception ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

The argument at Phaedo 74 B 4‐C 6 that the equal itself is ‘something different from’ sets of physical equals depends on Leibniz's Law: there is a property that perceptible equals have that the equal itself does not have. What I call the ‘epistemic interpretation’ holds that the property is an epistemic one: having appeared unequal. The ‘ontological interpretation’ holds that the property is not epistemic, but simply the property of being unequal (that is: physical equals suffer the compresence of opposites, while the equal itself does not). The most natural reading of the text favours the epistemic interpretation; scholarly support for the ontological interpretation is based on the widely held view that on the epistemic interpretation the argument is manifestly invalid. But this view implicitly relies on an impoverished sense of ‘appearing’ as equivalent to ‘being thought’. Drawing on an analogy with colour perception, I elaborate an experiential sense of ‘appearing’ which makes Plato's argument on the epistemic interpretation philosophically defensible.

Realization, Powers, and Property Identity

The Monist ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney Shoemaker ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Property Identity

Leibniz's Law and the Antinomy of the Liar

1969 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito F. Sinisi
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
The Liar

Metaphysics of composition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Composition As Identity ◽  
Special Composition Question ◽  
Grounding Problem ◽  
Composite Objects ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Special Composition

Composition occurs when one or more objects are parts of another object. The metaphysics of composition concerns the nature of composition – i.e. what it is, and how it works. Some of the more important questions philosophers have regarding the metaphysics of composition are the following: (1) When does composition occur? This is van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question’. Four prominent answers to this question include: (i) objects compose another object when those former objects are in contact; (ii) any two or more objects compose another object; (iii) objects never compose another object; (iv) objects compose another object when the activities of the former objects constitute a life. (2) Are composite objects identical with their parts? Proponents of ‘composition as identity’ answer ‘yes’ to this question. There are two primary variants of composition as identity, ‘strong’ composition as identity and ‘weak’ composition as identity. The most prominent objection to strong composition as identity is an objection from Leibniz’s Law: composite objects cannot be identical with their parts, since they seem to have properties which their parts do not have. (3) Is it possible for one object to constitute another object? Here ‘constitution’ is the relation which is alleged to obtain between, for example, a clay statue and the lump of clay from which it is formed. We can distinguish between the thesis that constitution is identity, and the thesis that constitution is not identity. The chief motivation which leads some philosophers to reject the thesis that constitution is not identity is the ‘grounding problem’ for that thesis. (4) Are there, in addition to composite objects, the ‘forms’ of those objects, and if so, what is the relationship between composite objects and their forms? We can distinguish between (at least) two variants of hylomorphism (the thesis that objects have forms), with the main distinction between the two views being whether or not they regard forms as being among the parts of composite objects.

Nomic Essentialism

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Theodore Sider
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Property Identity ◽  
Nomic Role

According to nomic (or causal, or dispositional) essentialists, the identity of a property is tied up with its nomic role, the role it plays in the laws of nature. Modally speaking this is straightforward: a property could not have obeyed different laws. But postmodally it is unclear what it means, since it is hard to see how to state the fundamental facts without mentioning particular properties. Various ideas are considered and criticized, such as that facts about property instantiations, or property existence, or property identity, are grounded in facts about laws; and that the laws are essential to properties. The latter, it is argued, is insufficiently metaphysically specific to count as an improvement on the modal formulation.

Propositional attitude statements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Semantic Function ◽  
False Conclusion ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Apparent Violation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Indiscernibility Of Identicals

Propositional attitude statements – statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears – exhibit certain logical peculiarities. For example, in apparent violation of Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals, we cannot freely substitute expressions which designate the same object within such statements. According to Leibniz’s law, every instance of the following scheme is valid: - a = b - F(a) - Therefore, F(b) The validity of Leibniz’s law seems beyond question. It says, in effect, that if an object has a certain property, then anything identical to that object also has that property. Valid instances abound. But consider the following apparently invalid instance: - Hesperus is Phosphorus - Hammurabi believed that Hesperus often rose in the evening - Therefore, Hammurabi believed that ‘Phosphorus’ often rose in the evening. If we take ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to serve as the predicate F and ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to be a and b respectively, this argument appears to be an instance of Leibniz’s law. Yet (3) apparently fails to follow from (1) and (2). Hammurabi believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus were two heavenly bodies not one. And he believed that Hesperus did, but that Phosphorus did not rise in the evening. We have derived a false conclusion from true premises and an apparently valid law. If that law is really valid, then our argument had better not be a genuine instance of the law. The tempting conclusion, widely accepted, is that we were wrong to construe propositional attitude statements as simple predications. We should not, that is, construe ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to be just a long predicate with the semantic function of attributing some property to the object commonly denoted by ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. But then the question arises: if attitude reports are not simple predications, what are they? Philosophers have disagreed sharply in their answers. Moreover, their disagreements are intimately connected to a wide range of deep issues about the nature of meaning and reference.

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