Objections, Rejection, Revision
This chapter considers six objections to the error theory. It argues if we cannot believe the error theory, these objections fail. It then asks whether opponents of the error theory can resist the book’s arguments by rejecting the claims that played a central role in these arguments. It argues that our inability to believe the error theory may make this seem legitimate, but that it is actually illegitimate. The chapter also considers and rejects several challenges to the role that these claims play in the book’s arguments. It ends by arguing that if we cannot believe the error theory, non-cognitivism, reductive realism, and fictionalism cannot be defended as revisionary alternatives to the error theory.
2018 ◽
Vol 8
(4)
◽
pp. 300-321
2017 ◽
2017 ◽
Vol 922
(4)
◽
pp. 7-12
◽
2018 ◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):