Normative Judgements and Properties

Author(s):  
Bart Streumer

This chapter first characterizes normative judgements, normative properties, and descriptive properties. It notes that these characterizations are compatible with different views about what makes a judgement or property normative. It then describes the four main views about normative judgements and properties: non-reductive realism, reductive realism, non-cognitivism, and the error theory. It also briefly describes some other views about these judgements and properties: cognitivist expressivism, descriptive fictionalism, constructivism, constitutivism, and quietism. The chapter then lists three claims that will play a central role in the book’s arguments, and briefly explains the role these claims will play in these arguments. It ends by suggesting different ways to read the book.

Author(s):  
Bart Streumer

This chapter considers six objections to the error theory. It argues if we cannot believe the error theory, these objections fail. It then asks whether opponents of the error theory can resist the book’s arguments by rejecting the claims that played a central role in these arguments. It argues that our inability to believe the error theory may make this seem legitimate, but that it is actually illegitimate. The chapter also considers and rejects several challenges to the role that these claims play in the book’s arguments. It ends by arguing that if we cannot believe the error theory, non-cognitivism, reductive realism, and fictionalism cannot be defended as revisionary alternatives to the error theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 300-321
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this contribution, I argue that none of the steps of this master argument succeed, and that Streumer’s arguments leave puzzles about what it means to ascribe a property at all.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 697-706
Author(s):  
Anandi Hattiangadi

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer’s objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer’s objections to primitivism can be met.


2017 ◽  
Vol 922 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.A. Shekhovtsov ◽  
R.P. Shekhovtsova ◽  
D.P. Ivenin ◽  
O.V. Raskatkina

The article contains the method of discrete scanning points in the vertical plane of the columns and roof trusses for the simultaneous determination of vertical columns, the distance between them in flight at their tip and deflection farms with one point standing and only one performer. The technique is based on the use of reflectorless electronic tachymeter and its SDh key. Experimental research of methods on the elements of building structures NNGASU educational housing using electronic tachymeter SET530R. Results of the experiments were monitored by a coordinate and photographic methods, as well as with the developed at the chair of Engineering Geodesy laser-mirroring device designed to measure inaccessible or hard to reach distances. Analysis methods of error theory position and the results of its comparison with other methods have shown that it provides the required accuracy, easy to perform, does not require the output of the observer on the crane path or lift to the towers, free from the multiple engagement of the bridge crane and can be successfully applied on practice.


Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.


Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  

This chapter gives a second and third version of the reduction argument against non-reductive realism. It notes that the second version of the argument does not appeal to (S) or to any other claim about supervenience. It argues that the reduction argument also applies to normative relations, such as the relation of being a reason for and the relation of resultance. It argues that the reduction argument does not support rampant reductionism. And it offers three explanations of why non-reductive realists often remain unmoved by the argument. The chapter concludes that if there are normative properties, these properties are identical to descriptive properties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 743-754
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  

I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.


1984 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-171
Author(s):  
D. Peterson
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document