Telling

2019 ◽  
pp. 48-71
Author(s):  
Katherine Hawley
Keyword(s):  
Norms Of Assertion

This chapter sets out an account of assertion—or telling—which is suitable for a unified account of trustworthiness in both speech and action, and which centrally involves commitment. On this picture, assertion involves simultaneously promising to speak truthfully on a given matter, and either keeping or breaking that promise. The promise is to utter the truth, not merely to be sincere or do one’s best to utter the truth. This account shows how assertion and promising are importantly similar, without implausibly identifying asserting that p with promising that p. The account is distinguished from the so-called ‘commitment account’ of assertion and also from the ‘assurance’ account of the epistemic significance of testimony, though it is compatible with such accounts. Finally, the chapter draws on chapter 2’s discussions of norms on promising, to explore possible norms of assertion; there is also discussion of the constitutive (or not) nature of such norms.

scholarly journals Problems with Norms of Assertion

2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 178-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Pagin
Keyword(s):  
Norms Of Assertion

Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives

Dialogue ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
RACHEL MCKINNON
Keyword(s):  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Relevant Alternatives ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory (NDAT), that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery propositions, while permitting assertions of what I call fallible propositions such as, “My car is in the driveway.”

scholarly journals Norms of assertion and communication in social networks

Synthese ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 190 (13) ◽  
pp. 2557-2571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik J. Olsson ◽  
Aron Vallinder
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Norms Of Assertion

Cognition and Communication

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions

Chapter 8 connects the discussion of epistemic norms of assertion to pragmatics more generally and to the pragmatics of knowledge ascriptions in particular. Some pragmatic theories and recent work in cognitive pragmatics and psycholinguistics are presented. By conjoining these accounts with the psychological considerations of Chapter 5, it is argued that knowledge ascriptions are often used as communicative heuristics, which are effective, albeit inaccurate, ways of getting complex epistemic points across. This conclusion is developed with regard to knowledge ascriptions which carry the directive force of recommending. Thus, Chapter 8 concludes Part II of the book by unifying some of its central discussions about cognitive psychology, epistemic norms, and pragmatics.

Assertion and the Future

2019 ◽  
pp. 479-504
Author(s):  
Corine Besson ◽  
Anandi Hattiangadi
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
The Future ◽  
Truth Norm

It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous.In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm.

The Open Future

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Classical Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Open Future ◽  
Patrick Todd

In The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False, Patrick Todd launches a sustained defense of a radical interpretation of the doctrine of the open future, one according to which all claims about undetermined aspects of the future are simply false. Todd argues that this theory is metaphysically more parsimonious than its rivals, and that objections to its logical and practical coherence are much overblown. Todd shows how proponents of this view can maintain classical logic, and argues that the view has substantial advantages over Ockhamist, supervaluationist, and relativist alternatives. Todd draws inspiration from theories of “neg-raising” in linguistics, from debates about omniscience within the philosophy of religion, and defends a crucial comparison between his account of future contingents and certain more familiar theories of counterfactuals. Further, Todd defends his theory of the open future from the charges that it cannot make sense of our practices of betting, makes our credences regarding future contingents unintelligible, and is at odds with proper norms of assertion. In the end, in Todd’s classical open future, we have a compelling new solution to the longstanding “problem of future contingents”.

Norms of Assertion

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Norms Of Assertion

Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (511) ◽  
pp. 837-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Doxastic Voluntarism ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Norms Of Belief ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
At Will

Abstract Doxastic involuntarists have paid insufficient attention to two debates in contemporary epistemology: the permissivism debate and the debate over norms of assertion and belief. In combination, these debates highlight a conception of belief on which, if you find yourself in what I will call an ‘equipollent case’ with respect to some proposition p, there will be no reason why you can’t believe p at will. While doxastic involuntarism is virtually epistemological orthodoxy, nothing in the entire stock of objections to belief at will blocks this route to doxastic voluntarism. Against the backdrop of the permissivism debate and the literature on norms of belief and assertion, doxastic involuntarism emerges as an article of faith, not the obvious truth it’s usually purported to be.

scholarly journals Experimental work on the norms of assertion

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. e12425 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Work ◽  
Norms Of Assertion
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