scholarly journals Investor Information Acquisition and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011–2012 Eurozone Crisis*

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 1445-1483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily A Gallagher ◽  
Lawrence D W Schmidt ◽  
Allan Timmermann ◽  
Russ Wermers

Abstract We study investor redemptions and portfolio rebalancing decisions of prime money market mutual funds (MMFs) during the Eurozone crisis. We find that sophisticated investors selectively acquire information about MMFs’ risk exposures to Europe, which leads managers to withdraw funding from information-sensitive European issuers. That is, MMF managers, particularly those serving the most sophisticated investors, selectively adjust their portfolio risk exposures to avoid information-sensitive European risks, while maintaining or increasing risk exposures to other regions. This mechanism helps to explain the occurrence of selective “dry-ups” in debt markets where delegation is common and returns to information production are usually low. (JEL G01, G21, G23) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

1989 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun H. Lam ◽  
Rajat Deb ◽  
Tom Fomby

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (8) ◽  
pp. 3766-3803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jawad M Addoum ◽  
Justin R Murfin

Abstract Equity markets fail to account for the value-relevant nonpublic information enjoyed by syndicated loan participants and reflected in publicly posted loan prices. A long-short strategy that buys (sells) the equities of firms with recently appreciated (depreciated) loans earns large risk-adjusted returns, suggesting a surprising and economically important level of segmentation across the same firm’s capital structure. The information lag captured by trading strategy returns is not affected by drivers of firm-specific attention, including the publication of loan returns in the Wall Street Journal. Instead, returns to the strategy are eliminated among equities held by mutual funds also trading in syndicated loans. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


1981 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Ferri ◽  
H. Dennis Oberhelman

1998 ◽  
Vol 1998 (24) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Price Dow ◽  
◽  
Douglas W. Elmendorf

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 225-247
Author(s):  
Vanessa Endrejat ◽  
Matthias Thiemann

At the heart of the last financial crisis stood the shadow banking system, a mesh of financial activities and entities that grew outside of bank balance sheets but with the support of the banking sector. These activities were not regulated or supervised like banks, and they were characterized by high maturity mismatches and leverage. Two prime elements were Money Market Mutual Funds and Asset-Backed Commercial Papers, which jointly performed bank-like functions. This paper sheds light on the fate of these entities post-crisis and the regulatory dynamics at play as policymakers shifted their focus from constraining their activities to drafting a European regulatory infrastructure that delivers both stability and growth. Based on expert interviews and document analysis, we show how European policymakers opened up to private experts during this shift to learn about the technical complexity of Money Market Mutual Funds and Asset-Backed Commercial Papers, but in the end were restricted in their efforts to craft such regulation due to competing national factions and the legislative time pressure at the European level. We argue that the process was heavily influenced by, first, nationally held visions about the future role of financial markets that came to the fore at pivotal moments during the negotiations, and, second, the specific European institutional set-up and its electoral cycle.


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