Non-banking financial intermediation and phenomena of shadow money in modern economy

Subject. The article addresses the non-banking financial intermediation (shadow banking system) as it is successfully expanding nowadays both in developed countries and emerging economics. Objectives. The study aims at conducting a comprehensive analysis of the specifics of non-banking financial intermediation, revealing its impact on economic agents’ activities, causes and consequences, and elaborating the methodological framework for effectiveness of modern monetary policy. Methods. I employ methods of scientific abstraction, induction, deduction, synthesis, and comparative analysis. Results. In the modern national economy, along with the money, created by the central bank and commercial banks, there are highly liquid financial instruments called shadow money. The scope of its application is shadow banking (financial intermediation) outside the banking system. The use of shadow money is caused by high demand for credit resources. Conclusions. The high activity of shadow banking and increased turnover of shadow money resulted from a transfer to Basel standards of banking regulation in the 1990s, which affected the lending activity of commercial banks. Under these conditions, the demand for loans provided by non-bank credit and financial institutions increased. The market of non-bank credit products was formed. However, the process of lending in the shadow banking is associated with high risks and non-stability of shadow money, widely used in this sphere.

Funny Money or Legitimate Finance? Shadow Banking and Policy Impacts in China

Government officials in China have taken different views regarding shadow banking. Some have seen the industry as overly risky, potentially undermining the formal financial system, while others have asserted that it is an increasingly important part of the financial system, filling a gap in finance provision to particular sectors and smaller firms. Do their views matter? Regulators have striven to crack down on the riskiest practices in shadow banking, but are the policies effective? In this article, we analyze the impact of government attitudes and actions on the shadow banking sector. Using a unique data set based on information collected from various sources in a difference-in-difference model, we find that shadow banking regulation plays a strong role in China’s financial sector, while contradictory government views (in the form of commentary in the People’s Daily) on shadow banking do not. This reveals that shadow banking is strongly affected by political authority when it is codified into regulation. Only some aspects of shadow banking can be legitimized through regulation, while the remainder of China’s financial system remains constrained due to state dominance over the financial sector. This underscores the “funny” nature of shadow banking’s money flows. This article is one of the first to study the effects of government views and regulations on the shadow banking system.

On Shadow Banking and Financial Frictions in DSGE Modeling

At the forefront of macroeconomic research on the causes of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) was and still is the usage of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. To capture the nonlinearities of the GFC, these models were enriched with a variety of financial frictions. This paper focuses on a special subset of these frictions, the shadow banking system. We provide a structured review of the strand of literature that considers shadow banking in DSGE setups and draw particular attention to the modeling approach as well as impact of shadow banking. Our analysis allows the following conclusions: firstly, models featuring shadow banking are better able to simulate realistic movements in the business cycle that are of comparable magnitude to the GFC. Secondly, the models consider amplification channels between the financial sector and the real economy that proved to be of importance during the crisis. Thirdly, the models display a good explanatory power of financial stability measures in the light of shadow banking.

Conclusion

A new Glass-Steagall Act would break up universal banks and end the conflicts of interest that prevent universal banks from acting as objective lenders and impartial investment advisers. It would produce a more stable and resilient financial system by reestablishing structural buffers to prevent contagion between the banking system and other financial sectors. It would improve market discipline by preventing banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to affiliates engaged in capital markets activities. It would shrink the shadow banking system by prohibiting nonbanks from issuing short-term financial claims that function as deposit substitutes. It would remove the dangerous influence that large financial conglomerates exercise over our political and regulatory systems. It would end the current situation in which our financial system and our economy are held hostage to the survival of universal banks and large shadow banks. It would restore our banking system and financial markets to their proper roles as servants—not masters—of nonfinancial business firms and consumers.

Financing Russian firms: Ireland and round tripping

Purpose Ireland has become one of the main sources of finance for Russian based firms. The purpose of this paper is to quantify and analyse these flows to examine governance and regulatory issues, in particular the possible effect of sanctions. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on detailed searches of publicly available filings in Company House, Ireland to identify Russian connected conduits. Data was extracted from available accounts and prospectuses for 106 conduits operating in Ireland for some or all of the period 2005-2017. Findings The paper shows gross flows from Irish based conduits to Russian firms amounted to €118bn for 2005-2017; flows may be partly explained by round tripping; sanctions have also affected flows; flows are facilitated by close linkages with professional networks both within Ireland, and other offshore financial centres, especially London; The conduits examined have no employees and are mostly owned by a charitable trust or trust. They have become a major part of a largely unregulated shadow banking system. Originality/value This paper used searches of publicly available company filings to create a unique database of individual firms. Data on the use of financial centres by individual firms is hard to obtain and the results of this study may be indicative of the use and nature of conduits in other financial centres which form part of the shadow banking sector.