scholarly journals Wealth Effects of Intraholding Company Bank Mergers: Evidence from Shareholder Returns

1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Whalen
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Tampakoudis ◽  
Michail Nerantzidis ◽  
Demetres Subeniotis ◽  
Apostolos Soutsas ◽  
Nikolaos Kiosses

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the wealth implications of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the unique Greek setting given the triple crisis phenomenon – banking, sovereign debt and economic crises – that prevailed after the global financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach The study examines bank M&As and bank transactions over the period from 1997 to 2018, as well as government-assisted M&As during the crisis. The wealth effects of bank M&As are assessed using both univariate and multivariate frameworks. Findings Findings show a neutral crisis effect on the valuation of M&As upon their announcement. However, the authors provide conclusive evidence that M&A completions are value-destroying events for acquiring banks during the crisis, far worse than in the pre-crisis period. Greek banks also fail to create value from government-assisted mergers. The results suggest that the financial stability and the prevention of further deepening of the Greek crisis with possible contagion effects were achieved at the expense of shareholders and taxpayers. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of the Greek triple crisis on the wealth effects of bank M&As and bank transactions. Also, the study provides first evidence with regard to the economic impact of government-assisted M&As in the European context.


2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Ongena ◽  
María Fabiana Penas

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 94-105
Author(s):  
Jean M. Canil ◽  
Bruce A. Rosser

We document a structure of pre-effort conditions associated with ESOPs. Since we can observe shareholder returns at award we infer incentive effects in a setting where premium and discounted executive stock options are regularly awarded. Discounted (premium) awards are associated with the highest (lowest) exercise rates, implying a successful incentive (disincentive) effect. Exercise restrictions (comprising hurdles and vesting restrictions) necessarily lower exercise rates, but may be preferred in combination with a discounted or premium award. Typically, a discount choice is associated with hurdles but not vesting restrictions. Empirically, shareholders benefit most from regular awards which are discounted and do not have hurdle price restrictions. Shareholders also benefit from hurdle provisions in irregular awards which may expose shareholders to CEO opportunism.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyndon Moore ◽  
Narly Dwarkasing ◽  
Fabio Braggion
Keyword(s):  

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