Study on Agricultural Product-coupled Subsidy Policy Considering Output Uncertainty and the Development of Tobacco Agriculture

Objectives: The health and well-ordered development of tobacco agriculture is very important. The incentive effects of plant-coupled subsidies and output-coupled subsidies on farming decisions with the consideration of uncertainty are investigated. The study shows that if the same unit subsidy is adopted, the incentive effect of the two policies will be determined by the expected output. When the expected output is higher, the incentive effect of the output-coupled subsidy is better than that of the plant-coupled subsidy. And when the expected output is lower, the incentive effect of the plant-coupled subsidy is better. If the implementation scheme limits the total amount of subsidies, it is better to determine subsidy policy by optimal output. The higher the optimal output is, the better the plant-coupled subsidy is. And when the optimal output is relatively low, the output-coupled subsidy shows a better incentive effect. Meanwhile, the study results also show that the incentive effects of the two coupled subsidy policies for increasing production and income are consistent, and the advantages of the policy with better incentive effects increase as the amount of subsidies increases.

Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking

We develop a theory of policymaking between an agent and an overseer, with a principal whose welfare is affected by agent-overseer interactions. The agent can increase the quality of policy outcomes through costly capacity investments. Oversight and agent bias jointly determine optimal agent capacity investments. We show that when oversight improves agent investment incentives the principal always benefits from an agent with biases opposite the overseer. Competing agent-overseer biases translate into higher quality policy outcomes than the principal could induce were she monitoring the agent. Effective oversight is necessary for these incentive effects. The results imply that political principals ought to consider the nature of the broader policymaking environment when appointing agents to make policy on their behalf and when designing managerial strategies aimed at motivating agents.

ncentive Effects Analysis on Primary and Secondary Teacher Incentive Policies in China

In recent years, many policies issued by central and local governments for primary and secondary school teachers in China are closely related to the incentive problems in their work. Based on the policy texts and empirical studies about teachers’ incentives, this paper discusses the incentive effects of teacher incentive policies. The outlines of this study are as follows: 1.Teacher incentive policies; 2. The incentive methods of teacher incentive policies; 3. Incentive effects of teacher incentive policies; 4. Teachers’ workloads and the effects of teacher incentive policies; and 5. Suggestions on teacher incentive policies.