Modeling the co-evolution of economic institutions and the economy of resource producing regions

The purpose of the study is to develop a model for the co-evolution of the regional economy and economic institutions. The research methods used: abstract-logical for the study of theoretical aspects and the experience of modeling co-evolution; and economic-mathematical for the development of own model of coevolution. The results of the study: approaches to modeling the evolution of economic institutions, as well as the co-evolution of the regional economy and economic institutions are considered, strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to modeling co-evolution are identified, on the basis of the logistic model and Lotka-Volterra equations, an own co-evolution model has been developed, which includes three entities: regional economy, “good” institution and “bad” institution. Three versions of the model have been developed: the co-evolution of the regional economy and the “good” institution, the co-evolution of the regional economy and the “bad institution,” and a variant of the co-evolution of all three entities simultaneously, in which the “good” and “bad” institutions interact according to the “predator-prey” model, and their the cumulative effect determines the development of the regional economy. Numerical experiments have been carried out in the MathLab, which have shown the capabilities of the model to reflect the results of the co-evolution of the economy of a resource-producing region and economic institutions. In the first variant, a “good” institution promotes economic growth in excess of the level determined by resource availability. In the second variant, the “bad” institution has a disincentive effect on the GRP, as a result of which the GRP falls below the level determined by the resource endowment. In the third variant, the interaction of “good” and “bad” institutions still contributes to economic growth above the level determined by resource availability, but causes cyclical fluctuations in the GRP.

Surprisingly small: effects of “generous” social benefits on re-employment of (quasi-) jobless households

This article analyses whether the extent of public welfare provision influences the speed at which (quasi-)jobless households get (back) into employment. (Quasi-)joblessness is one of the key criteria defining the risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU. Moreover, the perceived tension between the main functions of social benefits (protecting households from poverty and incentivising job search) is most acute among these households. Based on EU-SILC data, we examine changes of household work intensity during one year after benefit receipt. We observe that “more-generous” social benefits have a slightly negative impact. This can potentially be due to a disincentive effect of social benefits, but it can also mean that the additional financial leeway is used by job seekers to wait for more adequate job offers or engage in further training. Even though statistically significant, the estimated negative effects are very small.

Bounds on treatment effects in regression discontinuity designs with a manipulated running variable

The key assumption in regression discontinuity analysis is that the distribution of potential outcomes varies smoothly with the running variable around the cutoff. In many empirical contexts, however, this assumption is not credible; and the running variable is said to be manipulated in this case. In this paper, we show that while causal effects are not point identified under manipulation, one can derive sharp bounds under a general model that covers a wide range of empirical patterns. The extent of manipulation, which determines the width of the bounds, is inferred from the data in our setup. Our approach therefore does not require making a binary decision regarding whether manipulation occurs or not, and can be used to deliver manipulation‐robust inference in settings where manipulation is conceivable, but not obvious from the data. We use our methods to study the disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on (formal) reemployment in Brazil, and show that our bounds remain informative, despite the fact that manipulation has a sizable effect on our estimates of causal parameters.

Conflict resolution role of mediation in labor disputes in Turkey

Purpose This paper aims to manage better the conflicts in labor disputes by improving the understanding of mediation dynamics from a game-theoretical perspective. Design/methodology/approach Signaling game model is adapted to a hypothetical labor dispute based on the legislative regulations on the mandatory mediation system in Turkey. Findings The paper determines mediation equilibria in which both players get positive payoffs. Analysis of the mediation equilibria helps to improve the understanding about the litigation and mediation dynamics depending on the variables. The variables are clearly separated from each other due to their reverse effects on strategy choices of the parties. Mediation payoff and litigation cost are characterized by their incentive effects on mediation preferences, whereas mediation fee and litigation payoff are characterized by their disincentive effect. While increasing amounts of incentive variables strengthen the mediation tendency of the employee, increasing amounts of disincentive variables reveal the opposite effect. Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that if the litigation payoff is too small to recover litigation costs, accepting the mediation becomes the optimal strategy. This prediction is contrary to that of traditional game-theoretic litigation/settlement models, in which small-claim disputes typically cannot be settled. Practical implications The assumption that the mediation fee is not a part of the litigation cost eliminates the disincentive effect of mediation fee and makes it neutral on the strategy choice of employee. Originality/value This paper first analyzes the strategic role of mediation in labor disputes by using a signaling game. Despite its mediation focus, the paper also provides practical insights for litigation.

The Disincentive Effect of Stars: Evidence From Analyst Coverage

We hypothesize that when the winning odds are eclipsed by the presence of superstars, tournament participants will choose to bow out of the competition. We use the setting of financial analysts to test this hypothesis. We document that nonstar analysts avoid direct competition with star analysts through their coverage decisions. Moreover, nonstars’ reluctance to compete with stars is more pronounced when star analysts are more highly ranked, when winning the tournament carries higher rewards, when institutional ownership is lower, when the firm faces lower uncertainties, and when nonstars are of average ability. In addition, we show that nonstars who avoid direct competitions with stars are more likely to become an Institutional Investor All-star in the future, suggesting that competition avoidance benefits nonstars. Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of superstars discourages others from participating in the tournament.

Does External Debt Matter for Investment: Evidence from GMM

In theory, the main channel which through external debt would affect the growth rate is investment. On the one hand, external debt would boost the investment by providing more resources than domestically available. On the other hand, external debt would create a disincentive effect, as suggested by debt overhang arguments. Since it is not clear which effect will dominate in practice, empirical studies would be helpful to shed light on the issue. Moreover, one can argue that the effect of external debt on the private and public investment does not need to be the same. Therefore, aside from total investment we investigate the impact of external debt on disaggregated investment. We use dynamic panel analysis and data for a large sample of countries to investigate the subject at hand. Our results indicate that there exists a negative relationship between external debt and total investment. Furthermore, we find that both total and public external debt lowers the private investment, consistent with debt overhang arguments. On the other hand, there is no relationship between the external debt and government investment.

EFEK DISINSENTIF PROGRAM RASKIN DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP TRANSFER PANGAN ANTARGENERASI

The objective of this research was to investigate disincentive and crowding-out effect food aid program (public transfer) in household level. Beside the humanitarian roles, there are widespread sceptisms of food assistance regarding its possible influence on disincentive to work and on crowding out of private transfer (inter-household or intergeneration transfer). Based on Indonesia Family Life Survey data and using instrumental variables approach, this paper estimates disincentive effect and crowding out effect “Rice Program for Poor Families” (Raskin) on intergenerational food transfer (child to parents transfer). This research observe significant negative impact on total household income. The decline in income mostly happened through a reduction in head household worker. The paper also find indication of crowding out relation between private and public transfers. It suggests that the Indonesian government should have designed its public transfer scheme carefully in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its social safety net programs.

Besteuerung des Humanvermögens

The present article discusses the question of how to share the cost of higher education between the benefitting individual and the public optimally when labour income is taxed. Building on some previous work on the efficiency effects that income taxation has on human capital investment, the article demonstrates that in the presence of progressive income taxation a strong case can be made for the public to assume a fair share in the cost of higher education. The mix of private and public financing is shown to be efficient when the public share just neutralizes the negative effect that income taxation has upon the willingness to invest in higher education. The article then examines the efficient pattern of cost sharing in more detail. The article argues in favour of a two-part cost sharing scheme. The first part requires that the public subsidizes the cost of higher education to such an extent that the disincentive effect of progressive income taxation is neutralized. The second part requires that all remaining private expenditures are granted tax deduction against the income earned after studying. A particular virtue of the proposed two-part cost sharing scheme is that it gives individuals proper incentives to deploy effectively the stock of human capital acquired by studying.

Old age support in kind

It has been argued whether a transfer policy for elderly people should be in kind or in cash. This paper presents a rationale to answer the question in an endogenous growth model with a two-way intrafamily transfer in middle age, education for the child as an inter-vivos transfer, and informal parental care in exchange for a bequest. We have two analytical results. First, a transfer in cash, such as a public pension, prevents economic growth because a strategic behavior concerning caregiving generates a disincentive effect on education. Second, a transfer in kind, such as public formal care, promotes economic growth because the valuation of the service generates an additional benefit of education, which dominates the disincentive effect. Our results show that old age support should be in kind rather than in cash in the context of economic growth and also welfare if bequests are strategic.

Proposition de revenu familial garanti par intégration d’un régime bivalent d’allocations familiales à un régime de prestations sociales pour adultes

This paper deals with a bivalent family allowance plan comprising on the one hand a universal component and on the other, a selective component varying according to income. It will be shown that this plan will simultaneously comply with the horizontal equity objective for compensating dependants and the objective for making up family income deficiencies. This type of program must be integrated to a social welfare scheme for adults. The above-mentioned integrated scheme avoids the need for fiscal instruments such as tax credits and exemptions. Moreover, the proposed guaranteed family income scheme is preferable to a conventional guaranteed family income scheme in so far as it is as effective and generally even more effective, in making up family income deficiencies, while at the same time, insuring a horizontal equity compensation for the cost of raising children to those families whose incomes are above the poverty line. Finally, the proposed scheme is better than standard schemes because the disincentive effect on beneficiaries with regard to work effort is less.