Solving Kosovo’s problems becomes harder without Thaci

Significance Thaci resigned ahead of extradition to The Hague, following indictment for war crimes, including murder and torture, and participation in a joint criminal enterprise. The charges arise from Thaci’s role as a commander in the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). Three other high-profile political figures were also indicted and transferred to The Hague. Impacts The prospect of a crisis in Kosovo will force the incoming Biden administration to maintain its predecessor’s focus on the Balkans. The crisis will handicap a government battling a coronavirus second wave, which has already forced the country into partial lockdown. Mounting obstacles to a negotiated solution to Kosovo’s status increase the risk of a chaotic outcome, involving other parts of the Balkans.

Significance Ethnic and political tensions will rise after ICTY acquitted the radical Serb nationalist Seselj and convicted Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic, with Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) approaching elections in October. Impacts Most Serbs will find ICTY too harsh on Karadzic, though many have celebrated Seselj's release. Croats and Bosniaks across the Balkans will see Karadzic's verdict as lenient, and Seselj's release as a mockery of justice. Reopening the war crimes issue will keep alive divisions between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in BiH, Croatia and Serbia. The October elections will not only establish new municipal governments but also point to general elections in 2018.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Ainley

Since 1945 responsibility for atrocity has been individualized, and international tribunals and courts have been given effective jurisdiction over it. This article argues that the move to individual responsibility leaves significant ‘excesses’ of responsibility for war crimes unaccounted for. When courts do attempt to recognize the collective nature of war crime perpetration, through the doctrines of ‘command responsibility’, ‘joint criminal enterprise’ and ‘state responsibility’, the application of these doctrines has, it is argued, limited or perverse effects. The article suggests that instead of expecting courts to allocate excesses of responsibility, other accountability mechanisms should be used alongside trials to allocate political (rather than legal) responsibility for atrocity. The mechanisms favored here are ‘Responsibility and Truth Commissions’, i.e. well-resourced non-judicial commissions which are mandated to hold to account individual and collective actors rather than simply to provide an account of past violence.


Subject Profile of Minister of Defence Tomomi Inada. Significance Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's appointment this month of Tomomi Inada as defence minister was depicted as provocative by spokespeople in Seoul and Beijing. South Korea's SBS television called her "a right-winger who rejects the comfort women issue and the rulings of the Tokyo [war crimes] tribunal", while Chinese state-run television reported that Inada "has visited Yasukuni Shrine many times" and "denies Japan's history of aggression". Inada has occupied a high-profile role since her election to the lower house in 2005, and even before that championed revisionist causes. Impacts As a new face in a key cabinet position Inada will refresh the LDP's image. In interviews since her appointment Inada has shown restraint, suggesting that policy will not shift markedly to the right. Abe's government has always had close links with the far right; Inada's appointment is not a new direction.


Significance US attempts to renew mediation follows Prishtina’s withdrawal from talks in June, after Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaci was indicted for war crimes allegedly committed during the uprising against Serbia in 1998-99. Western influence may be rising just as Serbia’s relations with Russia are soured by suspicions that Moscow backed violent protests in Belgrade in July. Impacts Success in US- and EU-mediated talks between Belgrade and Prishtina is unlikely but would erode Russian influence in the Balkans. If relations with Vucic are dented, Kremlin can turn to its other regional ally and trouble-maker, Bosnian Serb leader Dodik. If SPS leaves office, it will lose control of key assets and could also be weakened by defections to the ruling SNS.


Significance Haradinaj was earlier summoned as a suspect to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (SC), part of the Kosovo judicial system but sitting in The Hague and with a mandate to try war crimes and crimes against humanity. His resignation is likely to trigger fresh elections and affect Kosovo’s stance in the status debate with Serbia, although much depends on the composition of the next government. Impacts The start, albeit belated, to addressing war crimes by the Kosovo Liberation Army is a significant step. Haradinaj's summons to the SC has united Albanians in both Kosovo and Albania around him, as a figure many see as a national hero. Conversely, the reopening of criminal procedures has caused satisfaction in Serbia, where many believe Haradinaj unfairly escaped justice.


2004 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 181
Author(s):  
Robert Legvold ◽  
John Hagan
Keyword(s):  

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