Simple power analysis attack against elliptic curve cryptography processor on FPGA implementation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahbuddin Abdul Kadir ◽  
Arif Sasongko ◽  
Muhammad Zulkifli
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Elliptic Curve Cryptography ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Fpga Implementation ◽  
Simple Power ◽  
Power Analysis Attack

scholarly journals Comparison of Simple Power Analysis Attack Resistant Algorithms for an Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Byrne ◽  
Nicolas Meloni ◽  
Arnaud Tisserand ◽  
Emanuel M. Popovici ◽  
William Peter Marnane
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem ◽  
Simple Power ◽  
Power Analysis Attack

scholarly journals Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem

2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomáš Fabšič ◽  
Ondrej Gallo ◽  
Viliam Hromada
Keyword(s):  
Power Consumption ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Simple Power ◽  
Mceliece Cryptosystem ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Power Analysis Attack

Abstract It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix P by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix Q. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix Q. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix Q allows to accelerate the attack significantly.

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