Information Freshness Over an Interference Channel: A Game Theoretic View

Author(s):  
Gam D. Nguyen ◽  
Sastry Kompella ◽  
Clement Kam ◽  
Jeffrey E. Wieselthier ◽  
Anthony Ephremides
2012 ◽  
Vol E95.B (10) ◽  
pp. 3345-3348
Author(s):  
Jiamin LI ◽  
Dongming WANG ◽  
Pengcheng ZHU ◽  
Lan TANG ◽  
Xiaohu YOU

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


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