Electricity Markets Cleared by Merit Order—Part I: Finding the Market Outcomes Supported by Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebrahim Hasan ◽  
Francisco D. Galiana ◽  
Antonio J. Conejo
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
Order Part

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

Capturing Electricity Market Dynamics in the Optimal Trading of Strategic Agents using Neural Network Constrained Optimization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mihály Dolányi ◽  
Kenneth Bruninx ◽  
Jean-François Toubeau ◽  
Erik Delarue
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Mathematical Program ◽  
Market Dynamics ◽  
Equilibrium Constraints ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
Optimal Trading ◽  
Optimal Bidding ◽  
Upper Level

In competitive electricity markets the optimal trading problem of an electricity market agent is commonly formulated as a bi-level program, and solved as mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). In this paper, an alternative paradigm, labeled as mathematical program with neural network constraint (MPNNC), is developed to incorporate complex market dynamics in the optimal bidding strategy. This method uses input-convex neural networks (ICNNs) to represent the mapping between the upper-level (agent) decisions and the lower-level (market) outcomes, i.e., to replace the lower-level problem by a neural network. In a comparative analysis, the optimal bidding problem of a load agent is formulated via the proposed MPNNC and via the classical bi-level programming method, and compared against each other.

scholarly journals Nash equilibria for coupling of CO2allowances and electricity markets

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 98-107
Author(s):  
Mireille Bossy ◽  
Nadia Maïzi ◽  
Odile Pourtallier
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Nash Equilibria

EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450007
Author(s):  
BRANDON LEHR
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Efficiency Wages

This paper builds a model of efficiency wages with heterogeneous workers in the economy who differ with respect to their disutility of labor effort. In such an economy, two types of pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria in firm wage offers can exist: a no-shirking equilibrium in which all workers exert effort while employed and a shirking equilibrium in which within each firm some workers exert effort while others shirk. The type of equilibrium that prevails in the economy depends crucially on the extent of heterogeneity among the workers and the equilibrium rate at which workers join firms from the unemployment pool.

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

2011 ◽  
Vol 214 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.M. Díaz-Báñez ◽  
M. Heredia ◽  
B. Pelegrín ◽  
P. Pérez-Lantero ◽  
I. Ventura
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Planar Location
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