Capturing Electricity Market Dynamics in the Optimal Trading of Strategic Agents using Neural Network Constrained Optimization

In competitive electricity markets the optimal trading problem of an electricity market agent is commonly formulated as a bi-level program, and solved as mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). In this paper, an alternative paradigm, labeled as mathematical program with neural network constraint (MPNNC), is developed to incorporate complex market dynamics in the optimal bidding strategy. This method uses input-convex neural networks (ICNNs) to represent the mapping between the upper-level (agent) decisions and the lower-level (market) outcomes, i.e., to replace the lower-level problem by a neural network. In a comparative analysis, the optimal bidding problem of a load agent is formulated via the proposed MPNNC and via the classical bi-level programming method, and compared against each other.

Reinforcement-learning-based optimal trading in a simulated futures market with heterogeneous agents

This paper simulates a futures market with multiple agents and sequential auctions, where agents receive long-lived heterogeneous signals on the true value of an asset and with a known deadline. The evolution of the amount of differential information and its impact on the distribution of overall gains and the pace of truth discovery is examined for various depth levels of the limit order book (LOB). The paper also formulates a dynamic programming model for the problem and presents an associated reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm for finding optimal strategy in exploiting informational disparity. This is done from the perspective of an agent whose information is superior to the collective information of the rest of the market. Finally, a numerical analysis is presented based on a futures market example to validate the proposed methodology for finding the optimal strategy. We find evidence in favor of a waiting strategy where agent does not reveal her signal until the last auction before the deadline. This result may help bring more insight into the micro-structural dynamics that work against market efficiency.

Capturing Electricity Market Dynamics in the Optimal Trading of Strategic Agents using Neural Network Constrained Optimization

In competitive electricity markets the optimal trading problem of an electricity market agent is commonly formulated as a bi-level program, and solved as mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). In this paper, an alternative paradigm, labeled as mathematical program with neural network constraint (MPNNC), is developed to incorporate complex market dynamics in the optimal bidding strategy. This method uses input-convex neural networks (ICNNs) to represent the mapping between the upper-level (agent) decisions and the lower-level (market) outcomes, i.e., to replace the lower-level problem by a neural network. In a comparative analysis, the optimal bidding problem of a load agent is formulated via the proposed MPNNC and via the classical bi-level programming method, and compared against each other.

Capturing Electricity Market Dynamics in the Optimal Trading of Strategic Agents using Neural Network Constrained Optimization

In competitive electricity markets the optimal trading problem of an electricity market agent is commonly formulated as a bi-level program, and solved as mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). In this paper, an alternative paradigm, labeled as mathematical program with neural network constraint (MPNNC), is developed to incorporate complex market dynamics in the optimal bidding strategy. This method uses input-convex neural networks (ICNNs) to represent the mapping between the upper-level (agent) decisions and the lower-level (market) outcomes, i.e., to replace the lower-level problem by a neural network. In a comparative analysis, the optimal bidding problem of a load agent is formulated via the proposed MPNNC and via the classical bi-level programming method, and compared against each other.

Anonymous Sealed-Bid Auction on Ethereum

In a competitive market, online auction systems enable optimal trading of digital products and services. Bidders can participate in existing blockchain-based auctions while protecting the confidentiality of their bids in a decentralized, transparent, secure, and auditable manner. However, in a competitive market, parties would prefer not to disclose their interests to competitors, and to remain anonymous during auctions. In this paper, we firstly analyze the specific requirements for blockchain-based anonymous fair auctions. We present a formal model tailored to study auction systems that facilitate anonymity, as well as a generic protocol for achieving bid confidentiality and bidder anonymity using existing cryptographic primitives such as designated verifier ring signature. We demonstrate that it is secure using the security model we presented. Towards the end, we demonstrate through extensive simulation results on Ethereum blockchain that the proposed protocol is practical and has minimal associated overhead. Furthermore, we discuss the complexity and vulnerabilities that a blockchain environment might introduce during implementation.

Optimal trading: The importance of being adaptive

We compare optimal static and dynamic solutions in trade execution. An optimal trade execution problem is considered where a trader is looking at a short-term price predictive signal while trading. When the trader creates an instantaneous market impact, it is shown that transaction costs of optimal adaptive strategies are substantially lower than the corresponding costs of the optimal static strategy. In the same spirit, in the case of transient impact, it is shown that strategies that observe the signal a finite number of times can dramatically reduce the transaction costs and improve the performance of the optimal static strategy.

Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline

In this paper, we study a model of continuous-time insider trading in which noise traders have some memories and the trading stops at a random deadline. By a filtering theory on fractional Brownian motion and the stochastic maximum principle, we obtain a necessary condition of the insider’s optimal strategy, an equation satisfied. It shows that when the volatility of noise traders is constant and the noise traders’ memories become weaker and weaker, the optimal trading intensity and the corresponding residual information tend to those, respectively, when noise traders have no any memory. And, numerical simulation illustrates that if both the trading intensity of the insider and the volatility of noise trades are independent of trading time, the insider’s expected profit is always lower than that when the asset value is disclosed at a finite fixed time; this is because the trading time ahead is a random deadline which yields the loss of the insider’s information.