Heterogeneous Dynasties and Long-Run Mobility

Recent empirical work has demonstrated a positive correlation between grandparent-child wealth-rank, even after controlling for parent-child wealth-rank, and a positive correlation between dynastic wealth-ranks across almost 600 years. We show that a simple heterogeneous agents model with idiosyncratic wealth returns generates a realistic wealth distribution but fails to capture these long-run patterns of wealth mobility. An auto-correlated returns specification of this model also fails to capture both short and long-run mobility. However, an extension of the heterogeneous agents model which includes permanent heterogeneity in wealth returns is able to simultaneously match the wealth distribution and short- and long-run wealth mobility.

Complexity Economics in a Time of Crisis: Heterogeneous Agents, Interconnections, and Contagion

In this article, we consider a variety of different mechanisms through which crises such as COVID-19 can propagate from the micro-economic behaviour of individual agents through to an economy’s aggregate dynamics and subsequently spill over into the global economy. Our central theme is one of changes in the behaviour of heterogeneous agents, agents who differ in terms of some measure of size, wealth, connectivity, or behaviour, in different parts of an economy. These are illustrated through a variety of case studies, from individuals and households with budgetary constraints, to financial markets, to companies composed of thousands of small projects, to companies that implement single multi-billion dollar projects. In each case, we emphasise the role of data or theoretical models and place them in the context of measuring their inter-connectivity and emergent dynamics. Some of these are simple models that need to be `dressed’ in socio-economic data to be used for policy-making, and we give an example of how to do this with housing markets, while others are more similar to archaeological evidence; they provide hints about the bigger picture but have yet to be unified with other results. The result is only an outline of what is possible but it shows that we are drawing closer to an integrated set of concepts, principles, and models. In the final section, we emphasise the potential as well as the limitations and what the future of these methods hold for economics.

Complementarity Modeling of a Ramsey-Type Equilibrium Problem with Heterogeneous Agents

We contribute to the field of Ramsey-type equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents. To this end, we state such a model in a time-continuous and time-discrete form, which in the latter case leads to a finite-dimensional mixed complementarity problem. We prove the existence of solutions of the latter problem using the theory of variational inequalities and present further properties of its solutions. Finally, we compute the growth dynamics in a calibrated model in which households differ with respect to their relative risk aversion, their discount factors, their initial wealth, and with respect to their interest rates on savings.

Two-stage training algorithm for AI robot soccer

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the cooperative learning behavior of agents is very important. In the field of heterogeneous multi-agent reinforcement learning, cooperative behavior among different types of agents in a group is pursued. Learning a joint-action set during centralized training is an attractive way to obtain such cooperative behavior; however, this method brings limited learning performance with heterogeneous agents. To improve the learning performance of heterogeneous agents during centralized training, two-stage heterogeneous centralized training which allows the training of multiple roles of heterogeneous agents is proposed. During training, two training processes are conducted in a series. One of the two stages is to attempt training each agent according to its role, aiming at the maximization of individual role rewards. The other is for training the agents as a whole to make them learn cooperative behaviors while attempting to maximize shared collective rewards, e.g., team rewards. Because these two training processes are conducted in a series in every time step, agents can learn how to maximize role rewards and team rewards simultaneously. The proposed method is applied to 5 versus 5 AI robot soccer for validation. The experiments are performed in a robot soccer environment using Webots robot simulation software. Simulation results show that the proposed method can train the robots of the robot soccer team effectively, achieving higher role rewards and higher team rewards as compared to other three approaches that can be used to solve problems of training cooperative multi-agent. Quantitatively, a team trained by the proposed method improves the score concede rate by 5% to 30% when compared to teams trained with the other approaches in matches against evaluation teams.

Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity

Information products provide agents with additional information that can be used to update actions. In many situations, access to such products can be quite limited. For instance, in epidemics, there tends to be a limited supply of medical testing kits, or tests. These tests are information products because their output of a positive or a negative answer informs individuals and authorities on the underlying state and the appropriate course of action. In this paper, using an analytical model, we show how the accuracy of a test in detecting the underlying state affects the demand for the information product differentially across heterogeneous agents. Correspondingly, the test accuracy can serve as a rationing device to ensure that the limited supply of information products is appropriately allocated to the heterogeneous agents. When test availability is low and the social planner is unable to allocate tests in a targeted manner to the agents, we find that moderately good tests can outperform perfect tests in terms of social outcome. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.