Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 359-402
Author(s):  
Magnus Hoffmann ◽  
Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 971-975
Author(s):  
Jun LIU ◽  
Deqing TAN




2007 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz


2010 ◽  
Vol 166 (4) ◽  
pp. 591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshihiro Tomaru ◽  
Kazuharu Kiyono


Author(s):  
Luca Lambertini ◽  
Alessandro Tampieri


2005 ◽  
Vol 273 (1583) ◽  
pp. 171-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A Cant ◽  
Sheng-Feng Shen


Author(s):  
Hong-Ren Din ◽  
Chia-Hung Sun

Abstract This paper investigates the theory of endogenous timing by taking into account a vertically-related market where an integrated firm competes with a downstream firm. Contrary to the standard results in the literature, we find that both firms play a sequential game in quantity competition and play a simultaneous game in price competition. Under mixed quantity-price competition, the firm choosing a price strategy moves first and the other firm choosing a quantity strategy moves later in equilibrium. Given that the timing of choosing actions is determined endogenously, aggregate profit (consumer surplus) is higher (lower) under price competition than under quantity competition. Lastly, social welfare is higher under quantity competition than under price competition when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low.



Author(s):  
Rabah Amir ◽  
Giuseppe De Feo


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Hu ◽  
Tomomichi Mizuno
Keyword(s):  


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